CACD – DISCURSIVA 2014 – DIPLOMATA – LÍNGUA INGLESA –WRITING EXAMINATION

www.inglesparaconcursos.blog.br

❑ PROVA DE LÍNGUA INGLESA:

• DIPLOMATA-CACD-WRITING EXAMINATION-2014-CESPE/UnB.

❑ ESTRUTURA-PROVA ESCRITA:

• (1) TRANSLATION  | 20 pontos |
• (2)  VERSION  | 15 pontos |
• (3)  SUMMARY | 15 pontos |
• (4) COMPOSITION | The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche | Carl Gustav Jung | 50 pontos | 

1 - TRANSLATION:

[value: 20 marks]

Translate into Portuguese the following excerpt adapted from George Orwell's "Homage to Catalonia".

In winter on the Zaragoza front, except at night, when a surprise attack was always conceivable, nobody bothered about the enemy. They were merely remote black insects whom one occasionally glimpsed hopping to and fro. The prime concern of both sides was essaying to keep warm. The things one normally associates with the horrors of war seldom raised their ugly heads. Up in the hills it was simply the mingled boredom and discomfort of stationary warfare. A life as uneventful as a city clerk's, and almost as regular. Atop each hill, knots of ragged, grimy men shivering round their flag. And all day and night, the senseless bullets and shells wandering across the empty valleys and only by some fluke getting home on a human body. I would gaze round the wintry landscape marveling at the futility, the inconclusiveness of such a kind of war. Could you forget that every mountain-top was occupied by troops and thus littered with tin cans and crusted with dung, the scenery was stupendous.

George Orwell. Homage to Catalonia.

Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1975, pp. 25-26.

>> TRANSLATION:

>> [In winter on the Zaragoza front, except at night, when a surprise attack was always conceivable, nobody bothered about the enemy.]

• No inverno, na frente de Zaragoza, ninguém se preocupava com o inimigo, exceto à noite, quando um ataque surpresa era sempre plausível.

- Tradutor google:

• No inverno, na frente de Zaragoza, exceto à noite, quando um ataque surpresa era sempre possível, ninguém se importava com o inimigo. (ERRO DE INTERLIGAÇÃO SUJEITO/OBJETO)

>> [They were merely remote black insects whom one occasionally glimpsed hopping to and fro.]

• Eles eram meros insetos pretos os quais alguém ocasionalmente percebia pulando de um lado a outro.
• Eles eram meros insetos pretos que ocasionalmente eram avistados pulando de um lado a outro.

- Tradutor google:

• Eles eram apenas insetos pretos remotos que ocasionalmente eram vistos pulando de um lado para o outro. (falta virgula, erro de estrutura)

>> [The prime concern of both sides was essaying to keep warm.]

• A preocupação central, de ambos os lados, era tentar se manter aquecido. 

- Tradutor google:

• A principal preocupação de ambos os lados era tentar se manter aquecido.  (falta virgula)
• OUTROS ERROS:
• A maior preocupação dos dois lados era tentar manterem-se aquecidos. (ausência de virgula & erro estrutural)
• A principal preocupação de ambos os lados era esforçar-se para manter-se aquecido. (ausência de virgula & erro estrutural)
• A maior preocupação de ambos os lados era tentar permanecer aquecido.  (ausência de virgula & erro estrutural)

- A estrutura correta é : "TENTAR SE MANTER AQUECIDO".

- "to essay" = try to do something.

>> [The things one normally associates with the horrors of war seldom raised their ugly heads.]

- Tradução correta:

• A preocupação central, de ambos os lados, era apenas tentar se manter aquecido.

- Tradutor google:

• As coisas que normalmente associamos aos horrores da guerra raramente surgiam. (falta virgula)
• OUTROS ERROS:
• A maior preocupação dos dois lados era tentar manterem-se aquecidos. (ausência de virgula & erro estrutural)
• A principal preocupação de ambos os lados era esforçar-se para manter-se aquecido. (ausência de virgula & erro estrutural)
• A maior preocupação de ambos os lados era tentar permanecer aquecido.  (ausência de virgula & erro estrutural)

- A estrutura correta é : "TENTAR SE MANTER AQUECIDO".

- "to essay" = try to do something.

Up in the hills it was simply the mingled boredom and discomfort of stationary warfare.

A life as uneventful as a city clerk's, and almost as regular. Atop each hill, knots of ragged, grimy men shivering round their flag. And all day and night, the senseless bullets and shells wandering across the empty valleys and only by some fluke getting home on a human body. I would gaze round the wintry landscape marveling at the futility, the inconclusiveness of such a kind of war. Could you forget that every mountain-top was occupied by troops and thus littered with tin cans and crusted with dung, the scenery was stupendous.

2 - VERSION:

[value: 15,00 marks]

Translate into English the following excerpt adapted from Foreign Minister Celso Lafer's lecture at Instituto Rio Branco in April 2001.

O novo ambiente internacional e seus cenários de conflito tornaram inadequadas as doutrinas de dissuasão nuclear e do "equilíbrio do terror", e, assim, passaram a ser ainda mais difíceis de justificar a retenção e o desenvolvimento de arsenais nucleares. Se aparentemente amainaram os riscos de uma conflagração atômica na escala contemplada à época da guerra fria, seguramente aumentaram os perigos difusos da violência de natureza descontrolada. Tais perigos aumentaram em função de uma faceta da globalização, que faz funcionar o mundo através de diversos tipos de redes. Entre estas estão as das finanças, que possibilitam, além dos movimentos rápidos dos fluxos de capital, a "lavagem" do dinheiro; as do crime organizado; as do tráfico de armas e de drogas; as do terrorismo; as das migrações clandestinas de pessoas, causadas por guerras e perseguições. No caso do Brasil, em função da porosidade das fronteiras, esses riscos provêm, em parte, do impacto interno, no território nacional, de fatores externos.

Celso Lafer. Resenha de Política Exterior do Brasil.

Número 88, 1.° semestre de 2001, MRE, p. 106.

3 - SUMMARY:

[value: 15 marks]

Write a summary, in no more than 200 words, of the following excerpt adapted from Michael S. Lunds's 1995 Foreign Affairs article "Underrating Preventive Diplomacy".

The malaise of U.S. foreign policy is such that academic gadflies now debunk any proposal sounding suspiciously positive. The charge is that proponents of preventive diplomacy oversell its potential, and naive policymakers are taking the bait. It is argued that problems of prescience, policy prescription, and political support mean the "intractable" conflicts "endemic" to the post-Cold War period cannot be averted unless major resources are invested in situations in which risks are high and success doubtful. Preventive diplomacy, the contention runs, merely means that one founders early in a crisis instead of later.

Scaremongers conjure up a nightmare in which zealous purveyors of preventive diplomacy mesmerize unwitting policymakers into buying a discount antidote for local quagmires, one with little potency and hidden side effects. Yet responsible proponents of preventive diplomacy obviously do not presume easy solutions to such disasters can be found, nor do they advise key players to do something, just anything, in dealing with incipient conflicts, tout preventive diplomacy as a cure-all with no cost or risk, or assume no value judgments need be made. Not only do the scaremongers distort the views being expressed but they insult policymakers by implying they would fall for such policy nostrums.

Advocacy of a policy slogan is confounded with adoption of the substance behind it. The fact that preventive diplomacy is a buzzword of foreign policy does not imply that early warning and conflict prevention have become official doctrine or standard operating procedure. The term "preventive diplomacy" refers to actions or institutions that are used to keep political disputes arising between or within nations from escalating into armed force. These efforts are needed when and where existing international relations or national politics fail to manage tensions without violence erupting. They come into play before a point of confrontation,

sustained violence, or military action is reached.

The claim is that while we know the societal conditions that stoke the chances of war or state collapse (e.g., poverty, environmental degradation, ethnic and economic divisions, and repressive, corrupt regimes, and so forth), murky individual and group decisions make it impossible to predict exactly when and where violence will surface. But just because political forecasting is not rocket science does not disqualify it. Unheralded acts, such as a military coup or a terrorist bombing, are very difficult to forecast. Early-warning specialists are, though, making progress in pinning down the probable precipitants of more gradual, phenomena such as ethnic conflict, genocide, and the breakdown of states. Demonstrations, repressive measures, hate rhetoric, arms build-ups, separatist communities forming parallel institutions: these signs one ignores at one's peril.

In Estonia, for example, restrictive citizenship and language laws adopted in 1993 by the newly-independent government were perceived by resident Russian speakers — then a third of Estonia's population — as discriminatory and threatening. Mindful of this group's powerful patron next door, the High Commissioner on National Minorities of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and other governmental and private actors took preventive steps to allay tensions.

The rub, so the argument runs, lies in knowing what actions to take. But preventive strategy is not the stab in the dark some observers insinuate. The blanket view that ethnic tensions uniformly lead to intractable conflicts is based on a few recent instances where, despite efforts to avoid it, violence has ensued: Croatia, Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda. One should look, instead, at the numerous ethnic and national disputes deemed potentially destabilizing and menacing that were actually managed in relative peace: Russia and Ukraine over Crimea, the break-up of the Czech and Slovak Republics, Congo's transition from autocracy, Zambia's non-violent shift toward democracy, and Hungary's moderated relations with its neighbors, among others. Such success stories are virtually ignored. Only two policy options ("little more than talking" or armed force) are mooted, whereas governments and NGOs have resorted to a gamut of measures to influence parties in disputes.

One may well be skeptical that preventive action would save more lives, cost less, and obviate the need for humanitarian intervention. No need, still, to go to the opposite extreme, wherein the financial and political cost of preventing such crises is prohibitive. The logic of conflict escalation is prima facie support for the view that less violent and short-lived disputes offer much greater opportunities for peaceful management by mediators. Issues in those types of disputes tend to be simple and singular, disputants are less rigidly polarized and politically mobilized, fatalities (and thus passions) are low, and communications and common institutions may have survived. Other states or external groups are less likely to have taken sides and may even share an interest in keeping local disputes from burgeoning.

The calculus of deciding whether preventive diplomacy is worth the price must comprehend the costs of alternatives such as mid-conflict intervention and non-involvement. That covers not only lives lost and injuries but also the price of humanitarian relief, refugee aid, and peacekeeping. It should also include the cost of losses in health, education, infrastructure, trade and investment opportunities, and natural resources.

The feeling is that the public will not endorse preventive diplomacy's risks and costs, but the considerations described above cast the issue of "political will" in a different light. Preventive efforts are often much less challenging and more prosaic than cases in which a government must endeavor to rouse the country to expose troops to possible danger abroad. For example, the dispatch of 500 American soldiers to join the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Macedonia was hardly noticed. Were preventive diplomacy to prosper, incipient conflicts would not even reach the desks of the National Security Council, the State Department's upper echelons, and the Pentagon.

Rather than ignore potential crises and threats out of some unexamined theory of their imagined intractability, policymakers might prudently track emerging political disputes around the world and develop policy options for addressing them promptly as opposed to belatedly. That would enable decision-makers to better assess whether they should act, when, with what means, and with whom. As successes mount, the burden of proof will shift to those who would still defend the notion that current wait-and-see policies and practices are best. The stakes in these potential crises are simply too high for such options to be dismissed with cavalier analyses carping on about a few frustrating experiences.

Michael S. Lund, Underrating Preventive Diplomacy, Foreign Affairs, July/August 1995 issue. Available at:

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/51214/michael-s-lund/un derrating-preventive-diplomacy.

Retrieved on 27.03.2014.

4 - COMPOSITION:

[Length: 400 to 450 words]

[value: 50 marks]

The most intense conflicts, if overcome, leave behind a sense of security and calm that is not easily disturbed. It is just these intense conflicts and their conflagration which are needed to produce valuable and lasting results.

Carl Gustav Jung.

The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche.

The Collected Works. V. 8. Routledge: London, 1960. p. 26.

In light of the quote above, comment on the possible positive effects, if any, of different conflicts throughout the twentieth century. 

CACD – DISCURSIVA 2012 – DIPLOMATA – LÍNGUA INGLESA –WRITING EXAMINATION

www.inglesparaconcursos.blog.br

❑ PROVA DE LÍNGUA INGLESA:

• DIPLOMATA-CACD-WRITING EXAMINATION-2012-CESPE/UnB.

❑ ESTRUTURA-PROVA ESCRITA (WRITING EXAMINATION):

• (1) TRANSLATION  | 20 pontos |
• (2)  VERSION  | 15 pontos |
• (3)  SUMMARY | 15 pontos |
• (4) COMPOSITION | China Daily | 50 pontos | 

1 - TRANSLATION:

Translate into Portuguese the following excerpt adapted from Isabel Hilton's review of The Opium Wars by Julia Lovell, published in The Guardian on 11th September 2011.

[value: 20 marks]

The Opium Wars were an inglorious episode on both sides. They were triggered by an upstart imperial power being snubbed and rebuffed in its quest for trade: there was nothing, the Chinese loftily told the British emissaries, which China needed or wanted from the West — not their goods, not their ideas, and definitely not their company.

In March 1839, Canton commissioner Lin Zexu, hot from arresting 1,600 opium smokers and confiscating a full 14 tonnes of the narcotic, ordered foreign merchants to hand over their stocks and undertake to bring no more. The British agreed to relinquish over 20,000 chests of premium Bengal-grown opium, assuring merchants all the while that the crown would make good their losses, thus transforming the dispute into an affair of state. Lin reported to Emperor Daoguang that matters had been satisfactorily concluded. Months later, somewhat to his amazement, the British gunboats arrived.

A motley cast of characters played their part in the ensuing tragicomedy: bungling officials, rogue merchants, unscrupulous politicians, muscular military imperialists and the dithering, bewildered emperor.

Internet: <www.guardian.co.uk>(adapted).

➽ TRADUÇÃO:

As Guerras do Ópio foram um episódio inglório para ambos os lados. Elas foram engatilhadas quando uma potência imperial ascendente foi esnobada e rejeitada em sua busca por comércio: não havia nada, os chineses disseram arrogantemente aos emissários britânicos, que a China quisesse ou de que precisasse do Ocidente – nem suas mercadorias, nem suas ideias e, definitivamente, nem sua companhia.
            

Em março de 1839, o comissão cantonês Lin Zaxu, incensado ao prender 1600 fumantes de ópio e confiscar nada menos que 14 toneladas do narcótico, ordenou a mercadores estrangeiros que entregassem seus estoques e tratassem de não trazer mais. Os britânicos concordaram m ceder mais de 20.000 baús de ópio cultivado em Bengala da melhor qualidade, garantindo aos mercadores nesse ínterim que a coroa compensaria suas perdas, transformando a disputa, assim, em um assunto de Estado. Lin reportou ao Imperador Daoguang que as questões haviam sido concluídas satisfatoriamente. Meses depois, um tanto para sua surpresa, as canhoneiras britânicas chegaram.
            

Uma trupe variegada de personagens fez seus papéis na tragicomédia que se seguiu: oficiais atrapalhados, mercadores fora-da-lei, políticos inescrupulosos, militares imperialistas musculosos e o vacilante, abismado imperador.

2 - VERSION:

Translate into English the following excerpt adapted from Maurício Carvalho Lyrio’s study “A ascensão da China como potência”

[value: 15 marks]

           

Historiadores e sinólogos convergem na avaliação de que a civilização chinesa impressiona não apenas por sua longevidade, mas também e principalmente por sua grandeza econômica e política ao longo de boa parte da história, quando comparada a outras civilizações antigas e modernas.
            

Francis Bacon observou que o mundo seiscentista se recriava pela pólvora, pela prensa e pelo ímã. Omitiu o fato, no entanto, de que todos os três foram descobertos séculos antes na China.
            

Malgrado seu status de economia mais pujante do mundo ao longo de três milênios, em 1829, já se vislumbravam os primeiros indícios da queda abrupta que apequenaria a economia chinesa diante das rivais europeias no século seguinte. Passadas sucessivas décadas de declínio relativo, a produção industrial chinesa era, nos anos 1930, menor do que a da Bélgica. Já sua produção de aparelhos e equipamentos não ultrapassava a de um estado do meio-oeste norte-americano.

M. C. Lyrio.A ascensão da China como potência:fundamentos políticos internos.

Brasília:FUNAG, 2010, p. 16-8.

➽ VERSÃO (Português→Inglês):

Historians and China specialists(1) agree on(2) the assessment that Chinese civilization is impressive(3) not only for its longevity, but also and mainly for economic and political greatness throughout a large part of(4)history, when compared to other ancient and modern civilizations.

            

Francis Bacon observed that the world in the 17th century(5)was recreated by gunpowder, the press, and the magnet. However, he omitted the fact that all three(6) were discovered centuries earlier(7) in China.

            

Despite its status as(8) the most powerful economy in the world throughout three millennia(9), in 1829, the first signs(10) of the sudden fall which would belittle the Chinese economy before(11) its European rivals in the following century were already visible(12). After successive decades(13) of relative decline, China's industrial production(14) was, in the 1930s, smaller than Belgium's (15). Yet , its production of machines and equipment did not surpass that of(16) a mid-west North-American state(17).
--------------------------------------------
TÉCNICAS DE TRANSLATION:

--------------------------------------------
*(1) Chine especialists = especialists on China = sinologist.
*(2) agree on= concordam em. No contexto, o verbo "to converg"(convergir) não é adequado, pois este transmite a ideia "come together" , ou seja, vir junto,mover/tender para um ponto.
*(3) A estrutura adequada é "is impressive"(é impressionante).

Estruturas como "amazes" ou "impressives" não são adequadas pois não estão na voz passiva. Lembre-se, "impressive" é adjetivo e, não é verbo.
*(4) A estrutura adequada é "a large part of" (uma grande/boa parte de).

No contexto, não são adequadas as estruturas "a huge part of"(uma enorme parte de),"a most part of"(a maior parte).
*(5) A banca examinadora não aceita "números romanos" em inglês, ou seja, a estrutura em português "século XVII" , em inglês fica:
"século XVII" → "seventeenth century" (forma extensa) ou apenas
"século XVII" → "17^th century". (na forma: número e subscrito do th).
*(6) Para "todos 3" → "all three" ou "all three of them" são estruturas adequadas no contexto.
*(7) Para "séculos antes" → "centuries earlier" ou "centuries before" são estruturas adequadas no contexto.
*(8) Para "status/condição de" → "status as" é a estrutura adequadas no contexto. A estrutura "status of" é inadequada.
*(9) Para "a economia mais pujante" → "the most powerful economy", ou ainda "the most striking...", "the most largest...", todas estão adequadas ao contexto.
*(10) Para "os primeiros indícios" → "the first signs" é a estrutura adequada no contexto pois transmite a ideia de sinal=indício. O substantivo  "signal"(sinal) na estrutura é inadequada.
👉Veja a diferença sutil entre "sign" e "signal":
👦Traffic sign: an advice, warning, etc 
👱Traffic signal: more likely refer to the traffic lights.
*(11) Para "diante de" → "before" é a preposição adequada.
*(12) Para "já se vislumbravam" → "were already visible" ou ainda "were already noticed".
*(13) Para "Passadas sucessivas décadas" → "After successive decades" é uma estrutura adequada, também são aceitáveis: "After several decades"(depois de várias décadas), "After decades in a row"(depois de décadas seguidas).
*(14) Para "Produção industrial da China
" → "China's industrial production" ou ainda "China's industrial output".
*(15) Para "menor do que a da Bélgica" → "smaller than Belgium's".
*(16) Após o verbo transitivo indireto "to surpass", a estrutura adequada é "that of"(a de) e não "that one of".
*(17) Para "um estado do meio-oeste norte-americano" → "a mid-west North-American state"(um estado norte-americano do meio-oeste) ou "a North-American mid-west state"(um estado norte-americano do meio-oeste).

3 - SUMMARY:

Write a summary, in your own words, of the following excerpt adapted from Michael Glosny’s 2010 Polity paper “China and the BRICs”. (Length: no more than 200 words)

[value: 15 marks]

           

Despite fundamental differences between the four countries and structural constraints of unipolarity that might have kept them from cooperating, the BRICs have surpassed most expectations in recent years in forming a nascent political grouping. On the foundation of other meetings between newly emerging powers, most importantly the trilateral Russia-India-China (RIC) arrangement, the BRIC foreign ministers began meeting in 2006. BRIC cooperation expanded to include two finance ministers’ summits, meetings of leaders, and a stand-alone BRIC leaders’ summit in June 2009, which produced a joint communiqué. Russia and Brazil have been the driving forces responsible for transforming the BRICs from an abstract financial concept into a genuine political grouping. However, the Chinese have also agreed to participate and cooperate. In a lengthy interview on the BRICs on the eve of the summit, Director-General Wu Hailong of the International Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs described the BRIC grouping as an “evolution from a hypothetical into a realistic platform for international cooperation.”
            

As the world’s second largest economy, a nuclear weapons state, a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, the largest holder of foreign exchange reserves, and a rising power whose influence is spreading across the globe, China has already been acknowledged as a superpower by the rest of the world. Having China as a partner has helped raise the profile of the other three BRICs partners, but China itself is less reliant on this association. However logical this cooperation may be, it is also costly and risky. As Chinese leaders’ time is limited and valuable, participation in meetings has an opportunity cost. Moreover, China also risks being perceived as participating in a political bloc designed to challenge and undermine the U.S. and the western liberal order.
            

For China, cooperation with the BRICs has occurred under the structural constraints of unipolarity, which provide it with an incentive to cooperate with the U.S. and ensure its behavior is not seen as a threat to which the hyper-sensitive hegemon might feel prompted to respond. However, China has benefited from its cooperation with the BRICs in significant ways. Looking forward, one of the major challenges for China in its engagement with the BRICs is how to maximize its benefits from cooperation while doing its utmost to make sure the U.S. does not perceive its cooperation with the BRICs as a threat. Zhao Gancheng, a researcher at the Shanghai Institute of International Studies, perfectly captures this dilemma in his analysis of BRIC cooperation. He argues that “[China’s] objective is through cooperation, to strengthen its position in the international system, but concomitantly to endeavor not to challenge the U.S. in a confrontational mode.” China does not see its cooperation with the BRICs as part of an anti-U.S. hard balancing coalition. Were anyone to attempt to move the BRICs in that direction, China would oppose the move, as would other member states. Despite the significance of BRIC cooperation, fundamental differences among the BRICs, the continued relevance of the U.S., and intra-BRIC competition and rivalry seriously limit the extent to which further BRIC cooperation can go. Looking to the future, as the U.S. declines and the BRICs continue to rise, it is very possible that intra-BRIC competition and rivalry will become fierce, further curbing cooperation among the member states.
            

U.S. policy is an important factor that could potentially overcome such limitations and push the BRICs toward more far-reaching cooperation. If the U.S. views limited BRIC cooperation as an anti-U.S. bloc and so adopts a more hostile policy towards this “alliance,” it may drive these countries closer together and thus create a self-fulfilling prophecy. Moreover, were the U.S. and other western countries to spurn BRIC demands for limited changes in the international order, the BRICs might well become disillusioned, see themselves as forced to mount a sweeping challenge, and seek to replace it with an order more suited to their interests. Thus far, this scenario seems unlikely. Western countries have started to show themselves to be more receptive to the idea of reforming the order and accommodating some of the BRIC demands. Although negotiation on reforming the international order is likely to be a drawn-out and difficult process, the willingness of western countries to entertain BRIC proposals should enhance the BRICs’ satisfaction with the international order, and so make them more likely to act as “responsible stakeholders.” That would put paid to the prospect of them challenging the status quo.
           

 Looking ahead, China’s power will likely provide a challenge to BRIC cooperation and the BRICs as a grouping. Although the other three powers have garnered prestige by their association with the rising Chinese juggernaut, analysts have begun to suggest that China’s overwhelming power relative to the other three will eventually undermine the BRICs as a coherent grouping. For instance, recent unofficial calls for a Sino-American G2 designed to address global challenges and manage the global order suggest China is no longer an emerging power or a developing country. However much this may raise concern for BRIC coherence, China is already much more powerful than the other BRICs by most measures. Moreover, its advantages have not hobbled the positive momentum of BRIC cooperation. Besides, although foreign analysts may call for a G2, Premier Wen Jiabao and most Chinese experts have criticized the concept as inappropriate and unworkable, arguing that China is too weak to shoulder such responsibility whilst recognizing that endorsing the idea would harm China’s diplomacy, isolating it from the developing world. In fact, rather than being eager to be seen as part of a G2 leading and managing the world, China’s leaders are more than glad to continue to keep a relatively low profile as a developing country, to cooperate with other emerging powers, and to benefit from this cooperation, all the while studiously avoiding being seen as standing up to the United States.

Michael A. Glosny. China and the BRICs:

a real (but limited) partnership in a unipolar world.

In: Polity, v. 42, n.º 1, January 2010, 100-29. Internet:<www.palgrave-journals.com> (adapted).

➽ RESUMO EM INGLÊS:           

Exceeding expectations, the BRICs has evolved from an abstract concept into a political group, mostly thanks to Brazilian and Russian efforts. However, China also acknowledges its importance as a means for international cooperation.
            

China’s economic, military and political clout characterizes it as a superpower. Whereas this is advantageous for its BRIC partners, it is a risk for China. Considering the structural constraints of unipolarity, China’s challenge is to keep profiting from the BRICs to reinforce its international position and, concomitantly, to avoid confronting the United States.
            

BRIC cooperation is limited by differences between its members, the US relevant international role and intra-group competition – which may intensify if the US declines. Conversely, if the US adopts an hostile policy towards the group, this would foster cooperation in the bloc. Western countries have recently shown interest in accepting BRICs demands for change in the international order lest the bloc feels forced to radicalize its stance.
            

Analysts suggest that China’s power will undermine the BRICs, and call for a Chinese-American alliance. Chinese disparage this possibility for they want to keep cooperating with developing countries, while avoiding competition with the US.

4 - COMPOSITION:

Taking due account of the text above and of China’s strategic objectives, comment on how its participation in the BRICS might fit into this framework.

[Length: 400-450 words]

[value: 50 marks]

            

In the joint declaration at the conclusion of the 4th BRICS Summit, the leaders of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa vowed to enhance mutual cooperation and contribute to world development and prosperity. The summit has come at a crucial moment, as the global economic recovery is still dragging its feet, entangled by fragile financial systems, high public and private debt, high unemployment and the rising price of oil. Pressing issues, such as climate change, food security and energy security also pose grave challenges. “BRICS cooperation now stands at a new starting point,” declared President Hu Jintao, adding that the five emerging economies need to build on current cooperation and blaze new trails so as to inject vitality into their mechanism and so usher in a more just, fair and reasonable international political and economic order.

China Daily, 30th March 2012. Internet: <www.chinadaily.com> (adapted)

➽ REDAÇÃO EM INGLÊS:            

While many Western countries still look hopeless trying to wade out of the economic morass into which they began to sink after the 2008 world crisis, the BRICS further their cooperation in order to address the most pressing issues today. Among them, China stands out as the most important emerging power of our times. Due to its singularity, it has three strategic objectives, which may benefit from BRICS cooperation: to achieve the appropriate level of development, necessary to grant its huge population a dignified life; to protect its territory against separatism; to make sure its ascend as a global superpower will be peaceful, i.e., that it will not entail confrontation with the US.
      

China is an ancient civilization, an Asian colossus, with a rich 5000-years history and a huge population. During most of its history, China has been an empire, but in the nineteenth century it fell prey to widespread corruption, internally, and was subjected to dreadful onslaughts by Western imperialism. As a result, its population has suffered severe hardship since then and only recently has China managed to begin its recovery. However, even today most part of the Chinese population still fights poverty and its under-development remains a cause for concern. Given that, China perceives the BRICS as a paramount forum, by means of which global economic governance may be reformed, so as to help, or at least not to hinder (as Araújo Castro would say) the development of the emerging powers and the rest of the Southern countries. 
      

Moreover, cooperation with the BRICS may also be of the utmost importance for China with respect to its territorial integrity. Throughout its history, and even today, Chinese leaders have always been cautious to prevent separatism from gaining momentum. Within the BRICS, China is able to establish closer links with two of its neighbors, India and Russia, thus neutralizing possible reasons for border issues, or being more capable of addressing them, were problems to emerge.
      

Furthermore, it can be said that Chinese culture is embedded in a notion of harmony. It does not want its inevitable rise as a superpower to be perceived as a threat by the “hypersensitive hegemon”, as Michael Glosny describes the US. China wants to emerge in a harmonious and peaceful way. Considering the jittery conditions of current international relations, the best way to avoid an aggressive North American reaction is to become closer to countries such as Brazil and India, which are commonly considered by the Western superpower as non-confrontational.
      

Given that there is no fundamental contradiction between China´s objectives and those of the other BRICS partners, it is reasonable to expect that China will continue to cooperate within the BRICS framework, in order to achieve its goals with respect to development, territorial integrity and peaceful coexistence with the US. 

CACD – DISCURSIVA 2011 – DIPLOMATA – LÍNGUA INGLESA –WRITING EXAMINATION

www.inglesparaconcursos.blog.br

❑ PROVA DE LÍNGUA INGLESA:

• DIPLOMATA-CACD-WRITING EXAMINATION-2011-CESPE/UnB.

❑ ESTRUTURA-PROVA ESCRITA:

• (1) TRANSLATION  | 20 pontos |
• (2)  VERSION  | 15 pontos |
• (3)  SUMMARY | 15 pontos |
• (4) COMPOSITION | China Daily | 50 pontos | 

1 - TRANSLATION:

Translate into Portuguese the following passage adapted from John Tomlinson's Globalization and Cultural Identity:

[value: 20 marks]

Once upon a time, local, autonomous, distinct and well-defined, robust and culturally sustaining connections existed between geographical place and cultural experience. They constituted one's "cultural identity"', something people simply "had" as an inheritance, a benefit of continuity with the past. Identity, then, was not just a description of cultural belonging; it was a collective treasure of local communities. But it proved to be fragile, needing protection and preservation. Into this world of manifold, discrete cultural identities suddenly burst the corrosive power of globalization. Globalization, so the story goes, has swept like a flood tide through the world’s diverse cultures, bringing a market-driven homogenization of cultural experience, thus obliterating the differences between locality-defined cultures. Whilst communities in the mainstream of the flow of capitalism have seen a sort of standardized version of their cultures exported worldwide, it is the “weaker”’ cultures of the developing world that have been most threatened.

John Tomlinson. Globalization and cultural

identity. Internet: <www.polity.co.uk>.

➽ TRADUÇÃO:

Houve um tempo em que conexões locais, autônomas, claras e bem definidas, robustas e culturalmente duradouras, existiam entre o espaço geográfico e a experiência cultural. Elas constituíam a "identidade cultural" de cada um, algo que as pessoas simplesmente "possuíam" como herança, um benefício de continuidade com o passado. A identidade, então, não era apenas uma descrição de pertencimento cultural, mas também um tesouro coletivo das comunidades locais; entretanto, ela mostrou-se frágil, dependente de proteção e de preservação. Nesse mundo com identidades culturais variadas e distintas, repentinamente irrompeu o poder corrosivo da globalização, que, seguindo a narrativa, varreu as diversas culturas do mundo como um maremoto, provocou uma homogeneização da experiência cultural orientada pelo mercado e, por conseguinte, obliterou as diferenças entre as culturas locais. Se as comunidades pertencentes ao “mainstream” do fluxo capitalista testemunharam a disseminação mundial de uma espécie de versão padronizada de suas culturas, foram as culturas “mais fracas” do mundo em desenvolvimento que sofreram a ameaça maior.

2 - VERSION:

Translate the following excerpt from Mauro José Teixeira Destri’s Globalização, Educação e Diversidade Cultural into English:

[value: 15 marks]

Os problemas da globalização e as consequências e desafios que ela apresenta a respeito de assuntos como a biodiversidade, a diversidade cultural e a educação estão fundamentados na perspectiva histórica da ocidentalização do mundo, iniciada pela dominação colonial europeia desde o século XV e ratificada pelo poderio norte-americano em todas as esferas, com seu poder de "disseminar cultura". Tal dominação do etnocentrismo ocidental, amparada por uma ideologia neoliberal, abrange não só o domínio econômico-financeiro, mas também o controle da informação e das comunicações referentes às grandes empresas multinacionais, impondo, dessa forma, uma “padronização” cultural. A globalização tem sua limitação mais grave por não ter um modelo de sociedade viável. A educação, concebida como a transmissão de visões do mundo, de saberes e de sistemas de valores, tem um enorme desafio histórico na defesa e na preservação da diversidade cultural, o que tem sido abordado em diversas esferas pelos diversos países ao redor do mundo.

Mauro José Teixeira Destri. Globalização, educação e diversidade cultural. Internet: <www.fsma.edu.br>.

➽ VERSÃO (Português→Inglês):

The problems of globalization and the consequences and challenges it presents concerning subjects(1) such as biodiversity, cultural diversity and education are based on(2) the historical perspectives of the world's occidentalization(3), which began with(4) European colonial dominance since the 15th century(5) and was ratified by the American might(6) in every sphere(7), with its power to "disseminate culture". This dominance of Western ethnocentrism, supported by(8) a neoliberal ideology, encompasses not only the economic and financial field, but also the control of information and communication related to(9) big multinational corporations, thereby imposing(10) a cultural "standardization". Globalization has its main limitation (11) because it does not have(12) a feasible model of society. Education, conceived as the transmission of world visions, of knowledge and of systems of values, has an enormous historical challenge in defending and preserving cultural diversity, which has been discussed in several spheres by many countries around the world.

------------------------------------------------------
TÉCNICAS DE TRANSLATION:
*(1)"a respeito de assuntos"→"concerning subjects".
*(2)"estão fundamentados em"→"based on".
*(3)"da occidentalização do mundo
"→"of the world's occidentalization".
*(4)"iniciada pela"→"which began with" (que começou com).
*(5)"século XV"→"15th century".
*(6)"poderio norte-americano"→"the American might".
*(7)"em todas as esferas"→ "in every sphere".
*(8)"amparado por/apoiada por "→ "supported by".
*(9)"referentes às/relacionadas às"→"related to".
*(10)"impondo assim  /dessa forma"→"thereby imposing".
*(11)"limitação mais grave / principal"→"main limitation".
*(12)"por não ter / por que não tem"→"because it does not have".

3 - SUMMARY:

Write in your own words a summary of the following article from The Economist in no more than 200 words.

[value: 15 marks]

Geoffrey Crowther, editor of The Economist from 1938 to 1956, used to advise young journalists to “simplify, then exaggerate”. He might have changed his advice if he had lived to witness the current debate on globalisation. There is a lively discussion about whether it is good or bad. But everybody seems to agree that globalisation is a fait accompli: that the world is flat, if you are a (Tom) Friedmanite, or that the world is run by a handful of global corporations, if you are a (Naomi) Kleinian.

Pankaj Ghemawat of IESE Business School in Spain is one of the few who has kept his head on the subject. For more than a decade he has subjected the simplifiers and exaggerators to a barrage of statistics. He has now set out his case — that we live in an era of semi-globalisation at most — in a single volume, World 3.0, that should be read by anyone who wants to understand the most important economic development of our time.

Mr Ghemawat points out that many indicators of global integration are surprisingly low. Only 2% of students are at universities outside their home countries; and only 3% of people live outside their country of birth. Only 7% of rice is traded across borders. Only 7% of directors of S&P 500 companies are foreigners — and, according to a study a few years ago, less than 1% of all American companies have any foreign operations. Exports are equivalent to only 20% of global GDP. Some of the most vital arteries of globalisation are badly clogged: air travel is restricted by bilateral treaties and ocean shipping is dominated by cartels.

Far from “ripping through people’s lives”, as Arundhati Roy, an Indian writer, claims, globalisation is shaped by familiar things, such as distance and cultural ties. Mr Ghemawat argues that two otherwise identical countries will engage in 42% more trade if they share a common language than if they do not, 47% more if both belong to a trading block, 114% more if they have a common currency and 188% more if they have a common colonial past.

What about the “new economy” of free-flowing capital and borderless information? Here Mr Ghemawat’s figures are even more striking. Foreign direct investment (FDI) accounts for only 9% of all fixed investment. Less than 20% of venture capital is deployed outside the fund’s home country. Only 20% of shares traded on stockmarkets are owned by foreign investors. Less than 20% of Internet traffic crosses national borders.

And what about the direction rather than the extent of globalisation? Surely Mr Friedman (author of The World is Flat) and company are right about where we are headed even if they exaggerate how far we have got? In fact, today’s levels of emigration pale beside those of a century ago, when 14% of Irish-born people and 10% of native Norwegians had emigrated. Back then you did not need visas. Today the world spends $88 billion a year on processing travel documents and in a tenth of the world’s countries a passport costs more than a tenth of the average annual income.

That FDI fell from nearly $2 trillion in 2007 to $1 trillion in 2009 can be put down to the global financial crisis. But other trends suggest that globalisation is reversible. Nearly a quarter of North American and European companies shortened their supply chains in 2008 (the effect of Japan’s disaster on its partsmakers will surely prompt further shortening). It takes three times as long to process a lorry-load of goods crossing the Canadian-American border as it did before September 11th 2001. Even the Internet is succumbing to this pattern of regionalisation, as governments impose a patchwork of local restrictions on content.

Mr Ghemawat also explodes the myth that the world is being taken over by a handful of giant companies. The level of concentration in many vital industries has fallen dramatically since 1950 and remained roughly constant since 1980: 60 years ago two car companies accounted for half of the world’s car production, compared with six companies today. He also refutes the idea that globalisation means homogenisation. The increasing uniformity of cities’ skylines worldwide masks growing choice within them, to which even the most global of companies must adjust. McDonald’s serves vegetarian burgers in India and spicy ones in Mexico, where Coca-Cola uses cane sugar rather than the corn syrup it uses in America. MTV, which went global on the assumption that “A-lop-bop-a-doo-bop-a-lop-bam-boom” meant the same in every language, now includes five calls to prayer a day in its Indonesian schedules. Mr Ghemawat notes that company bosses lead the pack when it comes to overestimating the extent of globalisation. Nokia, for example, spent years trying to break into Japan’s big but idiosyncratic mobile-handset market with its rest-of-the-world-beating products before finally conceding defeat. In general companies frequently have more to gain through exploiting national differences — perhaps through arbitrage — than by muscling them aside.

This sober view of globalisation deserves a wide audience. But whether it will get it is another matter. This is partly because World 3.0 is a much less exciting title than The World is Flat or “Jihad vs. McWorld”. And it is partly because people seem to have a natural tendency to overestimate the distance-destroying quality of technology. Go back to the era of dictators and world wars and you can find exactly the same addiction to globaloney. Henry Ford said cars and planes were “binding the world together”. Martin Heidegger said that “everything is equally far and equally near”. George Orwell got so annoyed by all this that he wrote a blistering attack on all the fashionable talk about the abolition of distance and the disappearance of frontiers — and that was in 1944, when Adolf Hitler was advancing his own unique approach to the flattening of the world.

The Economist.

April 23rd, 2011, p. 72.

➽ RESUMO EM INGLÊS:

Whilst writers such as Tom Friedman advocate that globalization is a reality, other thinkers have put this much talked about process under more severe scrutiny. Pankaj Ghemawat, for instance, asserts that the current scenario can be described as an era of semi-globalization.

            

According to the data compiled by the researcher, not many students are studying abroad, nor the number of people living outside their birth place is substantial. Few CEOs are foreigners, the amount of exported goods is relatively low and restrictions to transport flows are abundant. Furthermore, interstate relations are commonly established between countries that share a similar background. Surprisingly, foreign direct investment counts for 9% of the world's fixed investment. This relates to the fact that many states put a tight rein on Internet traffic.
            

Other myths are dissolved by Ghemawat. Current emigration levels are lower than those of a century ago, due to a more rigid passport control. Besides, regionalization is balking the flow of goods between borders. The author also refutes the idea of homogenization. Global companies are permanently adjusting their modus operandi to local premises. Not all of them, however, succeed when trying to penetrate certain local markets.
            

Ghemawat's view is disquieting, for it contests the tendency according to which people give technology an ubiquitous quality.

4 - COMPOSITION:

I do not want my house to be walled in on all sides and my windows to be stuffed. I want the cultures of all the lands to be blown about my house as freely as possible. But I refuse to be blown off my feet by any.

Mahatma Ghandi.

In light of the above quotation and of the other texts comprising the test, would you say that globalization is a threat to local culture or a source of its enrichment?

[Length: 400-450 words]

[value: 50 marks]

➽ REDAÇÃO EM INGLÊS:

Communication between different cultures and mutual influence are inherent in human history: no society can fully develop if it is kept in isolation, and Brazil provides a powerful example of the potential of intercultural dialogue. Yet, these relations often unfold under unequal terms, causing the imposition of the characteristics of a culture to the detriment of others. This is what Gandhi condemns in his statement, in accordance with the tolerant, but proud stance in relation to culture that he adopted throughout his life.
            

It is important, to begin with, to reject radical views that may tend to xenophobia. Language, music, dance, food: a brief analysis would show that all these aspects, which are at the core of any culture, evolved through interaction. A great deal of examples could be mentioned, but jazz and bossa nova suffice to illustrate this thesis: as the result of a complex process of cultural mixture of African, Brazilian and American sounds, these groundbreaking music styles are positive outcomes of a broad process of globalization. It is reasonable to imagine that Gandhi had something similar in mind when he talked about letting "cultures of all the lands to be blown about" his house.
            

Unfortunately, harmony is not the only possible result of globalization. History has shown time and again that interaction in a situation of inequality of economic or political forces tends to favor the values carried by the strongest part. Indeed, it would require a great deal of imagination to argue that indigenous people in Brazil benefited from their relations with the Portuguese invaders. Their near annihilation throughout the centuries, together with the impoverishment of the culture of the survivals, constitutes precisely the process of “being blown off his feet” described by Gandhi is his statement.
            

Current impacts globalization has on "weaker" cultures are not essentially different from those experienced by indigenous people. As clever as Pankaj Ghemawat’s argument about the adaptation of Mcdonald’s to Mexican’s spicy taste may sound, it is not clear how exactly this phenomenon contributes to preserving local cultures. The very substitution of ancient traditional meals for standardized fast food coming from the center of capitalism is enough to affect a people’s culture, and the addition of local features to the original product does little to prevent this from happening.
            

It is no easy task to find the right balance between inner characteristics and outside influence. Nonetheless, it is beyond doubt that, as Mauro José Teixeira Destri points out, education plays a pivotal role in providing citizens with the tools required to undertake this task. Only by forming critical, well-informed and conscious citizens will countries manage to neutralize the threats of globalization and use it as a source of enrichment. Otherwise, the future may be one of gloomy homogenization under the aegis of American influence.