CESPE/UnB – 2012 – DIPLOMATA – CACD – WRITING EXAMINATION – LÍNGUA INGLESA – CONCURSO DE ADMISSÃO À CARREIRA DE DIPLOMATA.

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➧ PROVA DE LÍNGUA INGLESA: CESPE/UnB-2012-DIPLOMATA-CACD-WRITING EXAMINATION.

➧ BANCA/ORGANIZADOR:http://www.cespe.unb.br/

➧ ESTRUTURA-WRITING EXAMINATION-2012:

➭ TRANSLATION (English/Portuguese) – 20 points.

- Text (3 parágrafos) – The Opium Wars || Julia Lovell || The Guardian.

➭ VERSION (Portuguese/English) – 15 points.

- Text (3 parágrafos) – A ascensão da China como potência:
fundamentos políticos internos.

➭ SUMMARY – 15 points.

-Text (10 parágrafos) – China and the BRICs: a real (but limited) partnership in a unipolar world || Polity || Michael A. Glosny || <www.palgrave-journals.com>.

➭ COMPOSITION – [Length: 400 to 450 words] – 50 points.

- Assunto (geral) – Text || China Daily.

- Tema (específico) – Comentar a participação dos BRICS para o desenvolvimento e a prosperidade mundial.

➧ PROVA:

Translate into Portuguese the following excerpt adapted from Isabel Hilton's review of The Opium Wars by Julia Lovell, published in The Guardian on 11th September 2011.

           

    The Opium Wars were an inglorious episode on both sides. They were triggered by an upstart imperial power being snubbed and rebuffed in its quest for trade: there was nothing, the Chinese loftily told the British emissaries, which China needed or wanted from the West — not their goods, not their ideas, and definitely not their company.
            

    In March 1839, Canton commissioner Lin Zexu, hot from arresting 1,600 opium smokers and confiscating a full 14 tonnes of the narcotic, ordered foreign merchants to hand over their stocks and undertake to bring no more. The British agreed to relinquish over 20,000 chests of premium Bengal-grown opium, assuring merchants all the while that the crown would make good their losses, thus transforming the dispute into an affair of state. Lin reported to Emperor Daoguang that matters had been satisfactorily concluded. Months later, somewhat to his amazement, the British gunboats arrived.
            

    A motley cast of characters played their part in the ensuing tragicomedy: bungling officials, rogue merchants, unscrupulous politicians, muscular military imperialists and the dithering, bewildered emperor.

Internet: <www.guardian.co.uk>

(adapted).

   Resposta    
Modelo 01:            

As Guerras do Ópio foram um episódio inglório para ambos os lados. Elas foram engatilhadas quando uma potência imperial ascendente foi esnobada e rejeitada em sua busca por comércio: não havia nada, os chineses disseram arrogantemente aos emissários britânicos, que a China quisesse ou de que precisasse do Ocidente – nem suas mercadorias, nem suas ideias e, definitivamente, nem sua companhia.
            

Em março de 1839, o comissão cantonês Lin Zaxu, incensado ao prender 1600 fumantes de ópio e confiscar nada menos que 14 toneladas do narcótico, ordenou a mercadores estrangeiros que entregassem seus estoques e tratassem de não trazer mais. Os britânicos concordaram m ceder mais de 20.000 baús de ópio cultivado em Bengala da melhor qualidade, garantindo aos mercadores nesse ínterim que a coroa compensaria suas perdas, transformando a disputa, assim, em um assunto de Estado. Lin reportou ao Imperador Daoguang que as questões haviam sido concluídas satisfatoriamente. Meses depois, um tanto para sua surpresa, as canhoneiras britânicas chegaram.
            

Uma trupe variegada de personagens fez seus papéis na tragicomédia que se seguiu: oficiais atrapalhados, mercadores fora-da-lei, políticos inescrupulosos, militares imperialistas musculosos e o vacilante, abismado imperador.

Translate into English the following excerpt adapted from Maurício Carvalho Lyrio’s study “A ascensão da China como potência”.

           

Historiadores e sinólogos convergem na avaliação de que a civilização chinesa impressiona não apenas por sua longevidade, mas também e principalmente por sua grandeza econômica e política ao longo de boa parte da história, quando comparada a outras civilizações antigas e modernas.
            

Francis Bacon observou que o mundo seiscentista se recriava pela pólvora, pela prensa e pelo ímã. Omitiu o fato, no entanto, de que todos os três foram descobertos séculos antes na China.
            

Malgrado seu status de economia mais pujante do mundo ao longo de três milênios, em 1829, já se vislumbravam os primeiros indícios da queda abrupta que apequenaria a economia chinesa diante das rivais europeias no século seguinte. Passadas sucessivas décadas de declínio relativo, a produção industrial chinesa era, nos anos 1930, menor do que a da Bélgica. Já sua produção de aparelhos e equipamentos não ultrapassava a de um estado do meio-oeste norte-americano.

M. C. Lyrio.

A ascensão da China como potência:

fundamentos políticos internos.

Brasília:FUNAG, 2010, p. 16-8.

   Resposta    
Modelo 01:            

Historians and China specialists(1) agree on(2) the assessment that Chinese civilization is impressive(3) not only for its longevity, but also and mainly for economic and political greatness throughout a large part of(4)history, when compared to other ancient and modern civilizations.

            

Francis Bacon observed that the world in the 17th century(5)was recreated by gunpowder, the press, and the magnet. However, he omitted the fact that all three(6) were discovered centuries earlier(7) in China.

            

Despite its status as(8) the most powerful economy in the world throughout three millennia(9), in 1829, the first signs(10) of the sudden fall which would belittle the Chinese economy before(11) its European rivals in the following century were already visible(12). After successive decades(13) of relative decline, China's industrial production(14) was, in the 1930s, smaller than Belgium's (15). Yet , its production of machines and equipment did not surpass that of(16) a mid-west North-American state(17).
--------------------------------------------
TÉCNICAS DE TRANSLATION:

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*(1) Chine especialists = especialists on China = sinologist.
*(2) agree on= concordam em. No contexto, o verbo "to converg"(convergir) não é adequado, pois este transmite a ideia "come together" , ou seja, vir junto,mover/tender para um ponto.
*(3) A estrutura adequada é "is impressive"(é impressionante).

Estruturas como "amazes" ou "impressives" não são adequadas pois não estão na voz passiva. Lembre-se, "impressive" é adjetivo e, não é verbo.
*(4) A estrutura adequada é "a large part of" (uma grande/boa parte de).

No contexto, não são adequadas as estruturas "a huge part of"(uma enorme parte de),"a most part of"(a maior parte).
*(5) A banca examinadora não aceita "números romanos" em inglês, ou seja, a estrutura em português "século XVII" , em inglês fica:
"século XVII" → "seventeenth century" (forma extensa) ou apenas
"século XVII" → "17^th century". (na forma: número e subscrito do th).
*(6) Para "todos 3" → "all three" ou "all three of them" são estruturas adequadas no contexto.
*(7) Para "séculos antes" → "centuries earlier" ou "centuries before" são estruturas adequadas no contexto.
*(8) Para "status/condição de" → "status as" é a estrutura adequadas no contexto. A estrutura "status of" é inadequada.
*(9) Para "a economia mais pujante" → "the most powerful economy", ou ainda "the most striking...", "the most largest...", todas estão adequadas ao contexto.
*(10) Para "os primeiros indícios" → "the first signs" é a estrutura adequada no contexto pois transmite a ideia de sinal=indício. O substantivo  "signal"(sinal) na estrutura é inadequada.
👉Veja a diferença sutil entre "sign" e "signal":
👦Traffic sign: an advice, warning, etc 
👱Traffic signal: more likely refer to the traffic lights.
*(11) Para "diante de" → "before" é a preposição adequada.
*(12) Para "já se vislumbravam" → "were already visible" ou ainda "were already noticed".
*(13) Para "Passadas sucessivas décadas" → "After successive decades" é uma estrutura adequada, também são aceitáveis: "After several decades"(depois de várias décadas), "After decades in a row"(depois de décadas seguidas).
*(14) Para "Produção industrial da China
" → "China's industrial production" ou ainda "China's industrial output".
*(15) Para "menor do que a da Bélgica" → "smaller than Belgium's".
*(16) Após o verbo transitivo indireto "to surpass", a estrutura adequada é "that of"(a de) e não "that one of".
*(17) Para "um estado do meio-oeste norte-americano" → "a mid-west North-American state"(um estado norte-americano do meio-oeste) ou "a North-American mid-west state"(um estado norte-americano do meio-oeste).

Write a summary, in your own words, of the following excerpt adapted from Michael Glosny’s 2010 Polity paper “China and the BRICs”. (Length: no more than 200 words)

           

Despite fundamental differences between the four countries and structural constraints of unipolarity that might have kept them from cooperating, the BRICs have surpassed most expectations in recent years in forming a nascent political grouping. On the foundation of other meetings between newly emerging powers, most importantly the trilateral Russia-India-China (RIC) arrangement, the BRIC foreign ministers began meeting in 2006. BRIC cooperation expanded to include two finance ministers’ summits, meetings of leaders, and a stand-alone BRIC leaders’ summit in June 2009, which produced a joint communiqué. Russia and Brazil have been the driving forces responsible for transforming the BRICs from an abstract financial concept into a genuine political grouping. However, the Chinese have also agreed to participate and cooperate. In a lengthy interview on the BRICs on the eve of the summit, Director-General Wu Hailong of the International Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs described the BRIC grouping as an “evolution from a hypothetical into a realistic platform for international cooperation.”
            

As the world’s second largest economy, a nuclear weapons state, a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, the largest holder of foreign exchange reserves, and a rising power whose influence is spreading across the globe, China has already been acknowledged as a superpower by the rest of the world. Having China as a partner has helped raise the profile of the other three BRICs partners, but China itself is less reliant on this association. However logical this cooperation may be, it is also costly and risky. As Chinese leaders’ time is limited and valuable, participation in meetings has an opportunity cost. Moreover, China also risks being perceived as participating in a political bloc designed to challenge and undermine the U.S. and the western liberal order.
            

For China, cooperation with the BRICs has occurred under the structural constraints of unipolarity, which provide it with an incentive to cooperate with the U.S. and ensure its behavior is not seen as a threat to which the hyper-sensitive hegemon might feel prompted to respond. However, China has benefited from its cooperation with the BRICs in significant ways. Looking forward, one of the major challenges for China in its engagement with the BRICs is how to maximize its benefits from cooperation while doing its utmost to make sure the U.S. does not perceive its cooperation with the BRICs as a threat. Zhao Gancheng, a researcher at the Shanghai Institute of International Studies, perfectly captures this dilemma in his analysis of BRIC cooperation. He argues that “[China’s] objective is through cooperation, to strengthen its position in the international system, but concomitantly to endeavor not to challenge the U.S. in a confrontational mode.” China does not see its cooperation with the BRICs as part of an anti-U.S. hard balancing coalition. Were anyone to attempt to move the BRICs in that direction, China would oppose the move, as would other member states. Despite the significance of BRIC cooperation, fundamental differences among the BRICs, the continued relevance of the U.S., and intra-BRIC competition and rivalry seriously limit the extent to which further BRIC cooperation can go. Looking to the future, as the U.S. declines and the BRICs continue to rise, it is very possible that intra-BRIC competition and rivalry will become fierce, further curbing cooperation among the member states.
            

U.S. policy is an important factor that could potentially overcome such limitations and push the BRICs toward more far-reaching cooperation. If the U.S. views limited BRIC cooperation as an anti-U.S. bloc and so adopts a more hostile policy towards this “alliance,” it may drive these countries closer together and thus create a self-fulfilling prophecy. Moreover, were the U.S. and other western countries to spurn BRIC demands for limited changes in the international order, the BRICs might well become disillusioned, see themselves as forced to mount a sweeping challenge, and seek to replace it with an order more suited to their interests. Thus far, this scenario seems unlikely. Western countries have started to show themselves to be more receptive to the idea of reforming the order and accommodating some of the BRIC demands. Although negotiation on reforming the international order is likely to be a drawn-out and difficult process, the willingness of western countries to entertain BRIC proposals should enhance the BRICs’ satisfaction with the international order, and so make them more likely to act as “responsible stakeholders.” That would put paid to the prospect of them challenging the status quo.
           

 Looking ahead, China’s power will likely provide a challenge to BRIC cooperation and the BRICs as a grouping. Although the other three powers have garnered prestige by their association with the rising Chinese juggernaut, analysts have begun to suggest that China’s overwhelming power relative to the other three will eventually undermine the BRICs as a coherent grouping. For instance, recent unofficial calls for a Sino-American G2 designed to address global challenges and manage the global order suggest China is no longer an emerging power or a developing country. However much this may raise concern for BRIC coherence, China is already much more powerful than the other BRICs by most measures. Moreover, its advantages have not hobbled the positive momentum of BRIC cooperation. Besides, although foreign analysts may call for a G2, Premier Wen Jiabao and most Chinese experts have criticized the concept as inappropriate and unworkable, arguing that China is too weak to shoulder such responsibility whilst recognizing that endorsing the idea would harm China’s diplomacy, isolating it from the developing world. In fact, rather than being eager to be seen as part of a G2 leading and managing the world, China’s leaders are more than glad to continue to keep a relatively low profile as a developing country, to cooperate with other emerging powers, and to benefit from this cooperation, all the while studiously avoiding being seen as standing up to the United States.

Michael A. Glosny. China and the BRICs:

a real (but limited) partnership in a unipolar world.

In: Polity, v. 42, n.º 1, January 2010, 100-29. Internet: <www.palgrave-journals.com> (adapted).

   Resposta    
Modelo 01:
           

Exceeding expectations, the BRICs has evolved from an abstract concept into a political group, mostly thanks to Brazilian and Russian efforts. However, China also acknowledges its importance as a means for international cooperation.
            

China’s economic, military and political clout characterizes it as a superpower. Whereas this is advantageous for its BRIC partners, it is a risk for China. Considering the structural constraints of unipolarity, China’s challenge is to keep profiting from the BRICs to reinforce its international position and, concomitantly, to avoid confronting the United States.
            

BRIC cooperation is limited by differences between its members, the US relevant international role and intra-group competition – which may intensify if the US declines. Conversely, if the US adopts an hostile policy towards the group, this would foster cooperation in the bloc. Western countries have recently shown interest in accepting BRICs demands for change in the international order lest the bloc feels forced to radicalize its stance.
            

Analysts suggest that China’s power will undermine the BRICs, and call for a Chinese-American alliance. Chinese disparage this possibility for they want to keep cooperating with developing countries, while avoiding competition with the US.

            

In the joint declaration at the conclusion of the 4th BRICS Summit, the leaders of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa vowed to enhance mutual cooperation and contribute to world development and prosperity. The summit has come at a crucial moment, as the global economic recovery is still dragging its feet, entangled by fragile financial systems, high public and private debt, high unemployment and the rising price of oil. Pressing issues, such as climate change, food security and energy security also pose grave challenges. “BRICS cooperation now stands at a new starting point,” declared President Hu Jintao, adding that the five emerging economies need to build on current cooperation and blaze new trails so as to inject vitality into their mechanism and so usher in a more just, fair and reasonable international political and economic order.

China Daily, 30th March 2012. Internet: <www.chinadaily.com> (adapted)

Taking due account of the text above and of China’s strategic objectives, comment on how its participation in the BRICS might fit into this framework.
[Length: 400-450 words]

   Resposta    

Modelo 01:

            

While many Western countries still look hopeless trying to wade out of the economic morass into which they began to sink after the 2008 world crisis, the BRICS further their cooperation in order to address the most pressing issues today. Among them, China stands out as the most important emerging power of our times. Due to its singularity, it has three strategic objectives, which may benefit from BRICS cooperation: to achieve the appropriate level of development, necessary to grant its huge population a dignified life; to protect its territory against separatism; to make sure its ascend as a global superpower will be peaceful, i.e., that it will not entail confrontation with the US.
      

China is an ancient civilization, an Asian colossus, with a rich 5000-years history and a huge population. During most of its history, China has been an empire, but in the nineteenth century it fell prey to widespread corruption, internally, and was subjected to dreadful onslaughts by Western imperialism. As a result, its population has suffered severe hardship since then and only recently has China managed to begin its recovery. However, even today most part of the Chinese population still fights poverty and its under-development remains a cause for concern. Given that, China perceives the BRICS as a paramount forum, by means of which global economic governance may be reformed, so as to help, or at least not to hinder (as Araújo Castro would say) the development of the emerging powers and the rest of the Southern countries. 
      

Moreover, cooperation with the BRICS may also be of the utmost importance for China with respect to its territorial integrity. Throughout its history, and even today, Chinese leaders have always been cautious to prevent separatism from gaining momentum. Within the BRICS, China is able to establish closer links with two of its neighbors, India and Russia, thus neutralizing possible reasons for border issues, or being more capable of addressing them, were problems to emerge.
      

Furthermore, it can be said that Chinese culture is embedded in a notion of harmony. It does not want its inevitable rise as a superpower to be perceived as a threat by the “hypersensitive hegemon”, as Michael Glosny describes the US. China wants to emerge in a harmonious and peaceful way. Considering the jittery conditions of current international relations, the best way to avoid an aggressive North American reaction is to become closer to countries such as Brazil and India, which are commonly considered by the Western superpower as non-confrontational.
      

Given that there is no fundamental contradiction between China´s objectives and those of the other BRICS partners, it is reasonable to expect that China will continue to cooperate within the BRICS framework, in order to achieve its goals with respect to development, territorial integrity and peaceful coexistence with the US.