sábado, 3 de janeiro de 2015

CACD TPS 2013 – DIPLOMATA – LÍNGUA INGLESA

www.inglesparaconcursos.blog.br

❑ PROVA DE LÍNGUA INGLESA:
  • DIPLOMATA-CACD-WRITING EXAMINATION-2013-CESPE/UnB.

❑ ESTRUTURA-PROVA ESCRITA (WRITING EXAMINATION):
  • (1) TRANSLATION  | 20 pontos |
  • (2)  VERSION  | 15 pontos |
  • (3)  SUMMARY | 15 pontos |
  • (4) COMPOSITION | Peru’s mineral wealth and woes | Carl Gustav Jung | 50 pontos | 



1 - TRANSLATION:
Translate into Portuguese the excerpt adapted from Peter Hughes’ article "It’s a jungle out there", published in The Spectator on 17th September 2011.
[value: 20 marks]

Iquitos, once a boom town, lies more than 2,000 miles from the mouth of the Amazon, yet here the river is still more than half a mile wide. You are deep in the steaming jungle. On both banks, rainforest comes tipping down to the water in a rough and tumble of vegetation sporting a million shades of green. Piranhas teem in the shallows while alligators idle on the banks. Birds of iridescent colours cackle and croak, whistle and squawk. Three-toed sloths lounge leisurely in the branches and monkeys career headlong through the treetops.
             
Into the midst of all this unbridled wildness there looms a floating incongruity in the discordant guise of a new three-storey luxury cruise boat. Aria, a 150-foot long glasshouse, is plying the waters around Iquitos at a point on the Amazon where Brazilian and Peruvian naval bases flaunt the armed flotillas farthest inland anywhere in the world. Luxury here spells everything the jungle is not: air conditioned, bug-, mud- and snake-free, comfortable and clean.
Internet: <www.spectator.co.uk/supplements/the-spectator-guide-tocruises/7238013/its-a-jungle-out-there/>
Retrieved on 13/9/2013.
TRADUÇÃO:
Iquitos, no passado uma cidade em crescimento, situa-se a mais de duas mil milhas de distância da entrada do rio Amazonas. Aqui, o rio tem mais de meia milha de largura. Você está nas profundezas dessa quente e úmida floresta. Em ambas as margens, a floresta tropical curva-se até a água em uma mistura desordenada de vegetação que possui milhões de gradações de verde. Piranhas abundam nas águas rasas enquanto jacarés descansam nas margens. Pássaros de cores brilhantes e chamativas fazem todos os tipos de barulhos e cantos. Preguiças de três dedos descansam agradavelmente nos galhos, e macacos deslocam-se rapidamente pelo topo das árvores.
          
No meio dessa natureza sem limites, aparece uma incongruência flutuante no
formato discordante de um novo navio de luxo de três andares. Aria, uma casa de vidro com 150 pés de comprimento, está navegando nas águas ao redor de Iquitos, em um local do Amazonas em que bases navais brasileiras e peruanas exibem grupos de navios armados que estão mais no interior do continente do que em qualquer outro lugar do mundo. O luxo, aqui, é tudo que a floresta não é: com ar condicionado, livre de insetos, lama e cobras, confortável e limpa.

2 - VERSION:
Translate into English the excerpt above adapted from a speech delivered by the Brazilian Minister of State for External Relations, Ambassador Luís Felipe Lampreia, in Brasília on February 16th, 1996.
[value: 15 marks]

Os países da América se unem hoje com um sentimento comum de satisfação para comemorar o primeiro aniversário da Declaração de Paz do Itamaraty, de 17 de fevereiro de 1995, que restabeleceu a confiança e a amizade entre dois povos irmãos.
            
Esse é o caminho: o diálogo, nunca a confrontação; a razão, jamais a força. Serão, por certo, desafiadoras essas negociações. A agenda é densa e os temas se entrelaçam numa teia de condicionantes múltiplos. Acima de tudo, será preciso saber projetar uma visão de futuro, inspirada no interesse de longo prazo dos dois países. Uma visão que enfrente o desafio de buscar formas, mais do que de convivência pacífica, de desenvolvimento solidário. Esse processo, de dimensão histórica, deverá proporcionar que as Partes se sintam estimuladas a assumir, de forma gradual e progressiva, as tarefas e responsabilidades de, conjuntamente, assegurarem não tão somente a paz na região como também o desenvolvimento e o
progresso social.
Source: Resenha de Política Exterior do Brasil,
número 78, 1º semestre de 1996, pp 37-38.

➽ VERSÃO (Português→Inglês):
The countries of America unite today with a common feeling of satisfaction to celebrate the first aniversary of the Peace Declaration of the Itamaraty, signed on the 17th of February 1995, which reestablished trust and friendship between two peoples that are brothers.
           
This is the path: dialogue, never confrontation; reason, never force. Negotiations will, certainly, be challenging. The agenda is dense and issues interconnect in a web of multiple conditioning factors. Above all, it will be necessary to project a vision of the future, inspired by the long term interests of both countries. A vision that faces the challenge of searching for ways of solidary development, going beyond peaceful coexistence. This process, of historic dimension, must create an environment where the parts feel estimulated to assume, gradually and progressively, the tasks and responsibilities of jointly ensuring not only peace in the region, but also development and social progress.

3 - SUMMARY:
Write a summary, in your own words, in no more than 200 words, of the previous excerpt adapted from John Crabtree's 2012 openDemocracy paper The new Andean politics: Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador.
[value: 15 marks]

A 700-kilometre march by indigenous protesters in Ecuador lasted two weeks before reaching the capital Quito on 22 March 2012. It echoes previous marches in both Peru and Bolivia against policies that pose a threat to indigenous communities.
            
The governments of all three Andean countries face criticism for policies designed to boost investment but that fail adequately to address the concerns of local people, who claim these projects threaten their physical and social environment.
             
Earlier in 2012, protesters from the northern Cajamarca region in Peru marched on Lima, repudiating plans to build a giant new copper and gold-mining plant at Conga, a project they say will affect water supplies to local communities.
            
These events are set against a background where, in all three countries, governments elected with the support of indigenous populations have taken steps to enshrine indigenous rights in their respective legal codes.
            
In Peru, these rights have recently been passed into law. Soon after his inauguration as president in July 2011, Ollanta Humala passed a law making prior consultation a legal obligation. Elected on a leftwing ticket that supported indigenous rights, Humala was obliged to enact a law vetoed by his predecessor, Alan García Perez. In 2009, García had faced down protests in the northern town of Bagua as indigenous groups protested against plans to facilitate hydrocarbons exploration and exploitation in the Amazon jungle. Some thirty people, including police, were killed in the fray.
            
The governments of Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador reflect aspects of what has been called the "pink wave" in Latin America, a reversion of the free-wheeling neo-liberal policies in vogue up until the early years of the new millennium — albeit to varying degrees. Bolivia and Ecuador belong to the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (Alba), spearheaded by President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela. Both countries have pursued policies highly critical of the United States and its policies towards Latin America. For his part, Peru’s Humala came to power having previously established and led a highly nationalistic party which, in the elections of 2011, made common cause with the parties of the Peruvian left. Since taking office, however, Humala has abandoned much of his earlier leftist rhetoric.
            
In Peru traditional party elites had failed conspicuously to resolve the country’s chronic economic and political problems, and were largely swept aside under the governments of Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000). But Fujimori’s departure from the scene did not lead to the resurgence of partisan organisation. Even the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (Apra), which dates from the 1930s and was once Peru’s largest mass party, remained but a shadow of its former self; in the 2011 elections it won only four seats in the 130-seat unicameral legislature.
            
All three presidents have had scope, therefore, to refashion their country’s electoral politics since taking power. In Bolivia, despite some defections, the MAS has a clear majority in both houses of the legislature, now known as the "plurinational legislative assembly". With only a modest presence, the opposition parties are effectively powerless to stop legislation.
            
Rafael Correa’s party, Alianza Pais (AP), has likewise enjoyed a working majority in Ecuador’s national assembly, although it has suffered some damaging defections in recent times. The situation is different in Peru, where Humala’s Gana Peru grouping did not win a majority in the 2011 elections, but has since entered into alliances with centrist and centre-right groupings which have (at least so far) afforded him parliamentary majorities.
            
All three presidents have managed to fashion good working relationships with their armed forces, still an important factor of power in this part of Latin America. In each case, they have used their electoral prowess to push through changes at senior levels to garner support in the barracks.
            
Opinion-polls suggest support for Humala has risen strongly since his election in 2011; admiration for his young and attractive wife, Nadine, who has displayed some consummate political skills since becoming the first lady, makes her a political factor. It is too soon to say what will happen when the president’s term ends in 2016. Humala has said he will not stand, and he lacks the parliamentary strength to change the constitution to be able to do so; but there are many who argue that he will seek to perpetuate his power by supporting the candidacy of his wife. This would be to emulate the Argentine model, whereby Néstor Kirchner was replaced as president by his wife, Cristina.
             
The future of mining and extractive industries more generally in Peru has become a major source of political discord, of which the Congas dispute is but the latest of a series of bitter confrontations. The Congas project involves the expansion of activities by Yanacocha, Latin America’s largest gold producer. It is formed by a consortium of Newmont Mining (of the United States), Buenaventura (a large Peruvian miner) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC), part of the World Bank. There has been a history of conflict between Yanacocha and local community groups and farmers stretching back over most of the past decade. The latter claim their livelihoods will be irretrievable damaged by the project.
            
Environmental impacts have been a major source of conflict between mining companies and communities throughout the Peruvian highlands. Several important projects have been halted owing to local pressure, including Yanacocha’s Cerro Quilish scheme near Cajamarca city. Peru has seen an unprecedented expansion in mining and hydrocarbons projects in recent years, attracting more investment than most other Andean countries. Often these investments take place in remote areas where the state is virtually absent and where no other legitimate entities are on hand to mediate disputes.
             
The president previously sided with local communities against extractive industries. But Humala has found himself under huge pressure from pro-mining lobby groups and other interested parties to shift his ground. Since his election victory, he has publically acknowledged the need to continue to support mining investments but argued that the resources generated thereby should be used to improve the living conditions of the poorest, including those living in the areas surrounding mining camps. In December 2011, he dismissed many of the more leftwing voices in his cabinet.
            
However, traditionally, the Peruvian state has proved unable to respond effectively to such social needs, lacking the administrative machinery to achieve its ends. While social spending has increased in recent years, the conditions of poverty in Peru’s interior have not improved substantially. Considerable doubt thus remains as to whether Humala will succeed where his predecessors failed.

John Crabtree. The new Andean politics: Bolivia. Peru, Ecuador. openDemocracy, 25 March 2012. Internet:<www.opendemocracy.net/john-crabtree/new-andean-politics-bolivia-peru-ecuador>. Retrieved on 18/9/2013. John Crabtree is a research associate at the Latin American Centre, St. Anthony's College, Oxford University.

RESUMO EM INGLÊS:
Peru, Bolivia and, most recently, Ecuador have faced protests by indigenous populations against policies and projects, such as mining facilities, that may endanger their communities or environments.
           
All three countries, however, have governments which were elected with the support of indigenous groups and have sought to promote their rights. These governments are part of an abandonment, in Latin America, of neo-liberal policies in favor of left-wing ones.
           
In Peru, president Humala faces tradititionally inept political elites which have been weakened by Alberto Fujimori’s ten-year government. In all three countries the government holds a parliament majority, even if, in Peru’s case, dependant on a coalition. This, and the good relationship sustained with the armed forces, has allowed these governments to reshape their countries’ political scene.
            
Mr. Humala’s support has risen steadily since his election, bolstered by his wife Nadine’s popularity. Extractive industries, however, have become the source of controversy in Peru. Even though invesment in industries such as mining is high, conflict between local communities and economic groups over environmental issues has been frequent. While Humala previeously sided with local communities, he now defends mining projects, advocating the use of the corresponding revenue to combat Peru’s long-neglected social ills.

4 - COMPOSITION:
Weigh up the potential benefits and drawbacks of Peru opening up and developing its Amazon region.
[Length: 400-450 words]
[value: 50 marks]
          
Peru's government, like those in other emerging economies, sees development of minerals and timber as the fastest way to lift the country out of poverty, particularly in the country's largely untouched Amazon region. In Peru, land ownership is private, but the government has full rights to the resources below ground — such as minerals, oil, and gas — and above it — such as water, fish, and timber. In 2007, President Garcia infamously dismissed what he called "the law of the dog in the manger, which says, 'If I do not do it, then let no one do it.'" Without the state to give out concessions, Garcia wrote, the land would remain undeveloped, with "unused resources that cannot be traded, that do not receive investment, and do not create jobs."
           
But indigenous groups and communities in the Amazon fear the government is engaged in a large-scale giveaway of their land to industry at the expense of their cultural heritage. "For the indigenous people, the land is sacred, but in [Western culture] the land is simply a resource," said Roger Rumrill, an expert on the Amazon's indigenous communities. The government recently created new concessions that would open up 70 percent of the Amazon to oil and gas exploration, though many of these concessions haven't been given out yet.

Toni Johnson. Peru’s mineral wealth and woes,
Council on Foreign Relations, 10th February 2010.
Internet: <www.cfr.org/peru/perus-mineral-wealth-woes/p21408#p4>. Retrieved on 19/9/2013.

➽ REDAÇÃO EM INGLÊS:            
Sustainable development is one of the most popular, perhaps even overused catchphrases of current environmental, political and diplomatic jargon. Social, economic and environmental balance, pursued with respect for the needs of future generations: behind this deceivingly simple definition lie lie the complex, and often divisive, realities faced by developing countries in their quest for social well-being. Peru exemplifies many of the dilemmas faced by such societies, especially in relation to its large Amazonian portion. This largely untouched region stands in the crossfire between indigenous, business, governmental and social interests, and the community as a whole must ponder very carefully its next steps, so as to not sacrifice or overindulge any of the groups involved.
           
Within this intricate wevb of interests, one of the most vocal contenders is the faction advocating uncompromising economic use of the rainforest’s resources. Ex-president Alan García, part of the ruling coalition and most Peruvian business leaders advocate immediate exploration of the region’s vast mineral wealth. The argument sustained is quite straightforward: in a country riddled with poverty and inequality, to leave a potential source of jobs, investment, government revenue and overall prosperity untouched is an unaffordable luxury. Principles of equality and welfare are downright useless if there is no wealth to distribute in the first place. This is a clear and forceful argument, that holds no small amount of truth.
           
Opponents of this view, however, are no less articulate and well-reasoned. Under Peruvian law, indigenous peoples have rights protecting their traditional lands, rights which cannot be set aside for the sake of economic convenience. To the indigenous point of view, environmentalists add the long-term interests of society, which will suffer if the ecological balance in the country is compromised. Another little-explored angle is the economic value of the forest itself, not as a logging camp but as a living, breathing source of biotechnological assets and touristic wealth. While the economic boost provided by simple extraction of resources is non-renewable and may be overshadowed by a future economic downturn resulting from environmental damage, research and development in medicine or nutrition, for example, make for sustainable economic practices of higher aggeegate value than the sale
of primary resources.
           
Thus, one must recognize the imperative ofeconomic growth, but simultaneously realize that Peru’s options in this pursuit are not limited to ransacking its Amazon region. Furthermore, short-term mining gains, if obtained in a limited, lawful and responsible manner, can be reconciled with long-term investments in education and the development of cutting-edge biotechnological industries. It is up to Peru’s society to debate, negotiate and compromise, so it can pursue the path of truly sustainable development.

CACD – DISCURSIVA 2014 – DIPLOMATA – LÍNGUA INGLESA –WRITING EXAMINATION

www.inglesparaconcursos.blog.br

❑ PROVA DE LÍNGUA INGLESA:
  • DIPLOMATA-CACD-WRITING EXAMINATION-2014-CESPE/UnB.

❑ ESTRUTURA-PROVA ESCRITA:
  • (1) TRANSLATION  | 20 pontos |
  • (2)  VERSION  | 15 pontos |
  • (3)  SUMMARY | 15 pontos |
  • (4) COMPOSITION | The Structure and Dynamics of the PsycheCarl Gustav Jung | 50 pontos | 



1 - TRANSLATION:
[value: 20 marks]
Translate into Portuguese the following excerpt adapted from George Orwell's "Homage to Catalonia".

In winter on the Zaragoza front, except at night, when a surprise attack was always conceivable, nobody bothered about the enemy. They were merely remote black insects whom one occasionally glimpsed hopping to and fro. The prime concern of both sides was essaying to keep warm. The things one normally associates with the horrors of war seldom raised their ugly heads. Up in the hills it was simply the mingled boredom and discomfort of stationary warfare. A life as uneventful as a city clerk's, and almost as regular. Atop each hill, knots of ragged, grimy men shivering round their flag. And all day and night, the senseless bullets and shells wandering across the empty valleys and only by some fluke getting home on a human body. I would gaze round the wintry landscape marveling at the futility, the inconclusiveness of such a kind of war. Could you forget that every mountain-top was occupied by troops and thus littered with tin cans and crusted with dung, the scenery was stupendous.
George Orwell. Homage to Catalonia.
Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1975, pp. 25-26.

>> TRANSLATION:

>> [In winter on the Zaragoza front, except at night, when a surprise attack was always conceivable, nobody bothered about the enemy.]
  • No inverno, na frente de Zaragoza, ninguém se preocupava com o inimigo, exceto à noite, quando um ataque surpresa era sempre plausível.
Tradutor google:
  • No inverno, na frente de Zaragoza, exceto à noite, quando um ataque surpresa era sempre possível, ninguém se importava com o inimigo. (ERRO DE INTERLIGAÇÃO SUJEITO/OBJETO)
>> [They were merely remote black insects whom one occasionally glimpsed hopping to and fro.]
  • Eles eram meros insetos pretos os quais alguém ocasionalmente percebia pulando de um lado a outro.
  • Eles eram meros insetos pretos que ocasionalmente eram avistados pulando de um lado a outro.
Tradutor google:
  • Eles eram apenas insetos pretos remotos que ocasionalmente eram vistos pulando de um lado para o outro. (falta virgula, erro de estrutura)
>> [The prime concern of both sides was essaying to keep warm.]
  • A preocupação central, de ambos os lados, era tentar se manter aquecido. 
Tradutor google:
  • A principal preocupação de ambos os lados era tentar se manter aquecido.  (falta virgula)
  • OUTROS ERROS:
  • A maior preocupação dos dois lados era tentar manterem-se aquecidos(ausência de virgula & erro estrutural)
  • A principal preocupação de ambos os lados era esforçar-se para manter-se aquecido(ausência de virgula & erro estrutural)
  • A maior preocupação de ambos os lados era tentar permanecer aquecido.  (ausência de virgula & erro estrutural)
- A estrutura correta é : "TENTAR SE MANTER AQUECIDO".
- "to essay" = try to do something.

>> [The things one normally associates with the horrors of war seldom raised their ugly heads.]

Tradução correta:
  • A preocupação central, de ambos os lados, era apenas tentar se manter aquecido.
Tradutor google:
  • As coisas que normalmente associamos aos horrores da guerra raramente surgiam. (falta virgula)
  • OUTROS ERROS:
  • A maior preocupação dos dois lados era tentar manterem-se aquecidos(ausência de virgula & erro estrutural)
  • A principal preocupação de ambos os lados era esforçar-se para manter-se aquecido(ausência de virgula & erro estrutural)
  • A maior preocupação de ambos os lados era tentar permanecer aquecido.  (ausência de virgula & erro estrutural)
- A estrutura correta é : "TENTAR SE MANTER AQUECIDO".
- "to essay" = try to do something.

Up in the hills it was simply the mingled boredom and discomfort of stationary warfare.

A life as uneventful as a city clerk's, and almost as regular. Atop each hill, knots of ragged, grimy men shivering round their flag. And all day and night, the senseless bullets and shells wandering across the empty valleys and only by some fluke getting home on a human body. I would gaze round the wintry landscape marveling at the futility, the inconclusiveness of such a kind of war. Could you forget that every mountain-top was occupied by troops and thus littered with tin cans and crusted with dung, the scenery was stupendous.

2 - VERSION:
[value: 15,00 marks]
Translate into English the following excerpt adapted from Foreign Minister Celso Lafer's lecture at Instituto Rio Branco in April 2001.

O novo ambiente internacional e seus cenários de conflito tornaram inadequadas as doutrinas de dissuasão nuclear e do "equilíbrio do terror", e, assim, passaram a ser ainda mais difíceis de justificar a retenção e o desenvolvimento de arsenais nucleares. Se aparentemente amainaram os riscos de uma conflagração atômica na escala contemplada à época da guerra fria, seguramente aumentaram os perigos difusos da violência de natureza descontrolada. Tais perigos aumentaram em função de uma faceta da globalização, que faz funcionar o mundo através de diversos tipos de redes. Entre estas estão as das finanças, que possibilitam, além dos movimentos rápidos dos fluxos de capital, a "lavagem" do dinheiro; as do crime organizado; as do tráfico de armas e de drogas; as do terrorismo; as das migrações clandestinas de pessoas, causadas por guerras e perseguições. No caso do Brasil, em função da porosidade das fronteiras, esses riscos provêm, em parte, do impacto interno, no território nacional, de fatores externos.
Celso Lafer. Resenha de Política Exterior do Brasil.
Número 88, 1.° semestre de 2001, MRE, p. 106.

3 - SUMMARY:
[value: 15 marks]
Write a summary, in no more than 200 words, of the following excerpt adapted from Michael S. Lunds's 1995 Foreign Affairs article "Underrating Preventive Diplomacy".

The malaise of U.S. foreign policy is such that academic gadflies now debunk any proposal sounding suspiciously positive. The charge is that proponents of preventive diplomacy oversell its potential, and naive policymakers are taking the bait. It is argued that problems of prescience, policy prescription, and political support mean the "intractable" conflicts "endemic" to the post-Cold War period cannot be averted unless major resources are invested in situations in which risks are high and success doubtful. Preventive diplomacy, the contention runs, merely means that one founders early in a crisis instead of later.

Scaremongers conjure up a nightmare in which zealous purveyors of preventive diplomacy mesmerize unwitting policymakers into buying a discount antidote for local quagmires, one with little potency and hidden side effects. Yet responsible proponents of preventive diplomacy obviously do not presume easy solutions to such disasters can be found, nor do they advise key players to do something, just anything, in dealing with incipient conflicts, tout preventive diplomacy as a cure-all with no cost or risk, or assume no value judgments need be made. Not only do the scaremongers distort the views being expressed but they insult policymakers by implying they would fall for such policy nostrums.

Advocacy of a policy slogan is confounded with adoption of the substance behind it. The fact that preventive diplomacy is a buzzword of foreign policy does not imply that early warning and conflict prevention have become official doctrine or standard operating procedure. The term "preventive diplomacy" refers to actions or institutions that are used to keep political disputes arising between or within nations from escalating into armed force. These efforts are needed when and where existing international relations or national politics fail to manage tensions without violence erupting. They come into play before a point of confrontation,
sustained violence, or military action is reached.

The claim is that while we know the societal conditions that stoke the chances of war or state collapse (e.g., poverty, environmental degradation, ethnic and economic divisions, and repressive, corrupt regimes, and so forth), murky individual and group decisions make it impossible to predict exactly when and where violence will surface. But just because political forecasting is not rocket science does not disqualify it. Unheralded acts, such as a military coup or a terrorist bombing, are very difficult to forecast. Early-warning specialists are, though, making progress in pinning down the probable precipitants of more gradual, phenomena such as ethnic conflict, genocide, and the breakdown of states. Demonstrations, repressive measures, hate rhetoric, arms build-ups, separatist communities forming parallel institutions: these signs one ignores at one's peril.

In Estonia, for example, restrictive citizenship and language laws adopted in 1993 by the newly-independent government were perceived by resident Russian speakers — then a third of Estonia's population — as discriminatory and threatening. Mindful of this group's powerful patron next door, the High Commissioner on National Minorities of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and other governmental and private actors took preventive steps to allay tensions.

The rub, so the argument runs, lies in knowing what actions to take. But preventive strategy is not the stab in the dark some observers insinuate. The blanket view that ethnic tensions uniformly lead to intractable conflicts is based on a few recent instances where, despite efforts to avoid it, violence has ensued: Croatia, Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda. One should look, instead, at the numerous ethnic and national disputes deemed potentially destabilizing and menacing that were actually managed in relative peace: Russia and Ukraine over Crimea, the break-up of the Czech and Slovak Republics, Congo's transition from autocracy, Zambia's non-violent shift toward democracy, and Hungary's moderated relations with its neighbors, among others. Such success stories are virtually ignored. Only two policy options ("little more than talking" or armed force) are mooted, whereas governments and NGOs have resorted to a gamut of measures to influence parties in disputes.

One may well be skeptical that preventive action would save more lives, cost less, and obviate the need for humanitarian intervention. No need, still, to go to the opposite extreme, wherein the financial and political cost of preventing such crises is prohibitive. The logic of conflict escalation is prima facie support for the view that less violent and short-lived disputes offer much greater opportunities for peaceful management by mediators. Issues in those types of disputes tend to be simple and singular, disputants are less rigidly polarized and politically mobilized, fatalities (and thus passions) are low, and communications and common institutions may have survived. Other states or external groups are less likely to have taken sides and may even share an interest in keeping local disputes from burgeoning.

The calculus of deciding whether preventive diplomacy is worth the price must comprehend the costs of alternatives such as mid-conflict intervention and non-involvement. That covers not only lives lost and injuries but also the price of humanitarian relief, refugee aid, and peacekeeping. It should also include the cost of losses in health, education, infrastructure, trade and investment opportunities, and natural resources.

The feeling is that the public will not endorse preventive diplomacy's risks and costs, but the considerations described above cast the issue of "political will" in a different light. Preventive efforts are often much less challenging and more prosaic than cases in which a government must endeavor to rouse the country to expose troops to possible danger abroad. For example, the dispatch of 500 American soldiers to join the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Macedonia was hardly noticed. Were preventive diplomacy to prosper, incipient conflicts would not even reach the desks of the National Security Council, the State Department's upper echelons, and the Pentagon.

Rather than ignore potential crises and threats out of some unexamined theory of their imagined intractability, policymakers might prudently track emerging political disputes around the world and develop policy options for addressing them promptly as opposed to belatedly. That would enable decision-makers to better assess whether they should act, when, with what means, and with whom. As successes mount, the burden of proof will shift to those who would still defend the notion that current wait-and-see policies and practices are best. The stakes in these potential crises are simply too high for such options to be dismissed with cavalier analyses carping on about a few frustrating experiences.
Michael S. Lund, Underrating Preventive Diplomacy, Foreign Affairs, July/August 1995 issue. Available at:
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/51214/michael-s-lund/un derrating-preventive-diplomacy.
Retrieved on 27.03.2014.


4 - COMPOSITION:
[Length: 400 to 450 words]
[value: 50 marks]

The most intense conflicts, if overcome, leave behind a sense of security and calm that is not easily disturbed. It is just these intense conflicts and their conflagration which are needed to produce valuable and lasting results.
Carl Gustav Jung.
The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche.
The Collected Works. V. 8. Routledge: London, 1960. p. 26.

In light of the quote above, comment on the possible positive effects, if any, of different conflicts throughout the twentieth century. 

CACD – DISCURSIVA 2012 – DIPLOMATA – LÍNGUA INGLESA –WRITING EXAMINATION

www.inglesparaconcursos.blog.br

❑ PROVA DE LÍNGUA INGLESA:
  • DIPLOMATA-CACD-WRITING EXAMINATION-2012-CESPE/UnB.

❑ ESTRUTURA-PROVA ESCRITA (WRITING EXAMINATION):
  • (1) TRANSLATION  | 20 pontos |
  • (2)  VERSION  | 15 pontos |
  • (3)  SUMMARY | 15 pontos |
  • (4) COMPOSITION | China Daily | 50 pontos | 



1 - TRANSLATION:
Translate into Portuguese the following excerpt adapted from Isabel Hilton's review of The Opium Wars by Julia Lovell, published in The Guardian on 11th September 2011.
[value: 20 marks]

The Opium Wars were an inglorious episode on both sides. They were triggered by an upstart imperial power being snubbed and rebuffed in its quest for trade: there was nothing, the Chinese loftily told the British emissaries, which China needed or wanted from the West — not their goods, not their ideas, and definitely not their company.

In March 1839, Canton commissioner Lin Zexu, hot from arresting 1,600 opium smokers and confiscating a full 14 tonnes of the narcotic, ordered foreign merchants to hand over their stocks and undertake to bring no more. The British agreed to relinquish over 20,000 chests of premium Bengal-grown opium, assuring merchants all the while that the crown would make good their losses, thus transforming the dispute into an affair of state. Lin reported to Emperor Daoguang that matters had been satisfactorily concluded. Months later, somewhat to his amazement, the British gunboats arrived.

A motley cast of characters played their part in the ensuing tragicomedy: bungling officials, rogue merchants, unscrupulous politicians, muscular military imperialists and the dithering, bewildered emperor.
Internet: <www.guardian.co.uk>(adapted).

➽ TRADUÇÃO:
As Guerras do Ópio foram um episódio inglório para ambos os lados. Elas foram engatilhadas quando uma potência imperial ascendente foi esnobada e rejeitada em sua busca por comércio: não havia nada, os chineses disseram arrogantemente aos emissários britânicos, que a China quisesse ou de que precisasse do Ocidente – nem suas mercadorias, nem suas ideias e, definitivamente, nem sua companhia.
            
Em março de 1839, o comissão cantonês Lin Zaxu, incensado ao prender 1600 fumantes de ópio e confiscar nada menos que 14 toneladas do narcótico, ordenou a mercadores estrangeiros que entregassem seus estoques e tratassem de não trazer mais. Os britânicos concordaram m ceder mais de 20.000 baús de ópio cultivado em Bengala da melhor qualidade, garantindo aos mercadores nesse ínterim que a coroa compensaria suas perdas, transformando a disputa, assim, em um assunto de Estado. Lin reportou ao Imperador Daoguang que as questões haviam sido concluídas satisfatoriamente. Meses depois, um tanto para sua surpresa, as canhoneiras britânicas chegaram.
            
Uma trupe variegada de personagens fez seus papéis na tragicomédia que se seguiu: oficiais atrapalhados, mercadores fora-da-lei, políticos inescrupulosos, militares imperialistas musculosos e o vacilante, abismado imperador.

2 - VERSION:
Translate into English the following excerpt adapted from Maurício Carvalho Lyrio’s study “A ascensão da China como potência
[value: 15 marks]
           
Historiadores e sinólogos convergem na avaliação de que a civilização chinesa impressiona não apenas por sua longevidade, mas também e principalmente por sua grandeza econômica e política ao longo de boa parte da história, quando comparada a outras civilizações antigas e modernas.
            
Francis Bacon observou que o mundo seiscentista se recriava pela pólvora, pela prensa e pelo ímã. Omitiu o fato, no entanto, de que todos os três foram descobertos séculos antes na China.
            
Malgrado seu status de economia mais pujante do mundo ao longo de três milênios, em 1829, já se vislumbravam os primeiros indícios da queda abrupta que apequenaria a economia chinesa diante das rivais europeias no século seguinte. Passadas sucessivas décadas de declínio relativo, a produção industrial chinesa era, nos anos 1930, menor do que a da Bélgica. Já sua produção de aparelhos e equipamentos não ultrapassava a de um estado do meio-oeste norte-americano.

M. C. Lyrio.A ascensão da China como potência:fundamentos políticos internos.
Brasília:FUNAG, 2010, p. 16-8.

➽ VERSÃO (Português→Inglês):
Historians and China specialists(1) agree on(2) the assessment that Chinese civilization is impressive(3) not only for its longevity, but also and mainly for economic and political greatness throughout a large part of(4)history, when compared to other ancient and modern civilizations.
            
Francis Bacon observed that the world in the 17th century(5)was recreated by gunpowder, the press, and the magnet. However, he omitted the fact that all three(6) were discovered centuries earlier(7) in China.
            
Despite its status as(8) the most powerful economy in the world throughout three millennia(9), in 1829, the first signs(10) of the sudden fall which would belittle the Chinese economy before(11) its European rivals in the following century were already visible(12). After successive decades(13) of relative decline, China's industrial production(14) was, in the 1930s, smaller than Belgium's (15). Yet , its production of machines and equipment did not surpass that of(16) a mid-west North-American state(17).
--------------------------------------------
TÉCNICAS DE TRANSLATION:
--------------------------------------------
*(1) Chine especialists = especialists on China = sinologist.
*(2) agree on= concordam em. No contexto, o verbo "to converg"(convergir) não é adequado, pois este transmite a ideia "come together" , ou seja, vir junto,mover/tender para um ponto.
*(3) A estrutura adequada é "is impressive"(é impressionante).
Estruturas como "amazes" ou "impressives" não são adequadas pois não estão na voz passiva. Lembre-se, "impressive" é adjetivo e, não é verbo.
*(4) A estrutura adequada é "a large part of" (uma grande/boa parte de).
No contexto, não são adequadas as estruturas "a huge part of"(uma enorme parte de),"a most part of"(a maior parte).
*(5) A banca examinadora não aceita "números romanos" em inglês, ou seja, a estrutura em português "século XVII" , em inglês fica:
"século XVII" → "seventeenth century" (forma extensa) ou apenas
"século XVII" → "17th century". (na forma: número e subscrito do th).
*(6) Para "todos 3" → "all three" ou "all three of them" são estruturas adequadas no contexto.
*(7) Para "séculos antes" → "centuries earlier" ou "centuries before" são estruturas adequadas no contexto.
*(8) Para "status/condição de" → "status as" é a estrutura adequadas no contexto. A estrutura "status of" é inadequada.
*(9) Para "a economia mais pujante" → "the most powerful economy", ou ainda "the most striking...", "the most largest...", todas estão adequadas ao contexto.
*(10) Para "os primeiros indícios" → "the first signs" é a estrutura adequada no contexto pois transmite a ideia de sinal=indício. O substantivo  "signal"(sinal) na estrutura é inadequada.
👉Veja a diferença sutil entre "sign" e "signal":
👦Traffic sign: an advice, warning, etc 
👱Traffic signal: more likely refer to the traffic lights.
*(11) Para "diante de" → "before" é a preposição adequada.
*(12) Para "já se vislumbravam" → "were already visible" ou ainda "were already noticed".
*(13) Para "Passadas sucessivas décadas" → "After successive decades" é uma estrutura adequada, também são aceitáveis: "After several decades"(depois de várias décadas), "After decades in a row"(depois de décadas seguidas).
*(14) Para "Produção industrial da China
" → "China's industrial production" ou ainda "China's industrial output".
*(15) Para "menor do que a da Bélgica" → "smaller than Belgium's".
*(16) Após o verbo transitivo indireto "to surpass", a estrutura adequada é "that of"(a de) e não "that one of".
*(17) Para "um estado do meio-oeste norte-americano" → "a mid-west North-American state"(um estado norte-americano do meio-oeste) ou "a North-American mid-west state"(um estado norte-americano do meio-oeste).

3 - SUMMARY:
Write a summary, in your own words, of the following excerpt adapted from Michael Glosny’s 2010 Polity paper China and the BRICs”. (Length: no more than 200 words)
[value: 15 marks]
           
Despite fundamental differences between the four countries and structural constraints of unipolarity that might have kept them from cooperating, the BRICs have surpassed most expectations in recent years in forming a nascent political grouping. On the foundation of other meetings between newly emerging powers, most importantly the trilateral Russia-India-China (RIC) arrangement, the BRIC foreign ministers began meeting in 2006. BRIC cooperation expanded to include two finance ministers’ summits, meetings of leaders, and a stand-alone BRIC leaders’ summit in June 2009, which produced a joint communiqué. Russia and Brazil have been the driving forces responsible for transforming the BRICs from an abstract financial concept into a genuine political grouping. However, the Chinese have also agreed to participate and cooperate. In a lengthy interview on the BRICs on the eve of the summit, Director-General Wu Hailong of the International Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs described the BRIC grouping as an “evolution from a hypothetical into a realistic platform for international cooperation.”
            
As the world’s second largest economy, a nuclear weapons state, a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, the largest holder of foreign exchange reserves, and a rising power whose influence is spreading across the globe, China has already been acknowledged as a superpower by the rest of the world. Having China as a partner has helped raise the profile of the other three BRICs partners, but China itself is less reliant on this association. However logical this cooperation may be, it is also costly and risky. As Chinese leaders’ time is limited and valuable, participation in meetings has an opportunity cost. Moreover, China also risks being perceived as participating in a political bloc designed to challenge and undermine the U.S. and the western liberal order.
            
For China, cooperation with the BRICs has occurred under the structural constraints of unipolarity, which provide it with an incentive to cooperate with the U.S. and ensure its behavior is not seen as a threat to which the hyper-sensitive hegemon might feel prompted to respond. However, China has benefited from its cooperation with the BRICs in significant ways. Looking forward, one of the major challenges for China in its engagement with the BRICs is how to maximize its benefits from cooperation while doing its utmost to make sure the U.S. does not perceive its cooperation with the BRICs as a threat. Zhao Gancheng, a researcher at the Shanghai Institute of International Studies, perfectly captures this dilemma in his analysis of BRIC cooperation. He argues that “[China’s] objective is through cooperation, to strengthen its position in the international system, but concomitantly to endeavor not to challenge the U.S. in a confrontational mode.” China does not see its cooperation with the BRICs as part of an anti-U.S. hard balancing coalition. Were anyone to attempt to move the BRICs in that direction, China would oppose the move, as would other member states. Despite the significance of BRIC cooperation, fundamental differences among the BRICs, the continued relevance of the U.S., and intra-BRIC competition and rivalry seriously limit the extent to which further BRIC cooperation can go. Looking to the future, as the U.S. declines and the BRICs continue to rise, it is very possible that intra-BRIC competition and rivalry will become fierce, further curbing cooperation among the member states.
            
U.S. policy is an important factor that could potentially overcome such limitations and push the BRICs toward more far-reaching cooperation. If the U.S. views limited BRIC cooperation as an anti-U.S. bloc and so adopts a more hostile policy towards this “alliance,” it may drive these countries closer together and thus create a self-fulfilling prophecy. Moreover, were the U.S. and other western countries to spurn BRIC demands for limited changes in the international order, the BRICs might well become disillusioned, see themselves as forced to mount a sweeping challenge, and seek to replace it with an order more suited to their interests. Thus far, this scenario seems unlikely. Western countries have started to show themselves to be more receptive to the idea of reforming the order and accommodating some of the BRIC demands. Although negotiation on reforming the international order is likely to be a drawn-out and difficult process, the willingness of western countries to entertain BRIC proposals should enhance the BRICs’ satisfaction with the international order, and so make them more likely to act as “responsible stakeholders.” That would put paid to the prospect of them challenging the status quo.
           
 Looking ahead, China’s power will likely provide a challenge to BRIC cooperation and the BRICs as a grouping. Although the other three powers have garnered prestige by their association with the rising Chinese juggernaut, analysts have begun to suggest that China’s overwhelming power relative to the other three will eventually undermine the BRICs as a coherent grouping. For instance, recent unofficial calls for a Sino-American G2 designed to address global challenges and manage the global order suggest China is no longer an emerging power or a developing country. However much this may raise concern for BRIC coherence, China is already much more powerful than the other BRICs by most measures. Moreover, its advantages have not hobbled the positive momentum of BRIC cooperation. Besides, although foreign analysts may call for a G2, Premier Wen Jiabao and most Chinese experts have criticized the concept as inappropriate and unworkable, arguing that China is too weak to shoulder such responsibility whilst recognizing that endorsing the idea would harm China’s diplomacy, isolating it from the developing world. In fact, rather than being eager to be seen as part of a G2 leading and managing the world, China’s leaders are more than glad to continue to keep a relatively low profile as a developing country, to cooperate with other emerging powers, and to benefit from this cooperation, all the while studiously avoiding being seen as standing up to the United States.

Michael A. Glosny. China and the BRICs:
a real (but limited) partnership in a unipolar world.
In: Polity, v. 42, n.º 1, January 2010, 100-29. Internet:<www.palgrave-journals.com> (adapted).

➽ RESUMO EM INGLÊS:           
Exceeding expectations, the BRICs has evolved from an abstract concept into a political group, mostly thanks to Brazilian and Russian efforts. However, China also acknowledges its importance as a means for international cooperation.
            
China’s economic, military and political clout characterizes it as a superpower. Whereas this is advantageous for its BRIC partners, it is a risk for China. Considering the structural constraints of unipolarity, China’s challenge is to keep profiting from the BRICs to reinforce its international position and, concomitantly, to avoid confronting the United States.
            
BRIC cooperation is limited by differences between its members, the US relevant international role and intra-group competition – which may intensify if the US declines. Conversely, if the US adopts an hostile policy towards the group, this would foster cooperation in the bloc. Western countries have recently shown interest in accepting BRICs demands for change in the international order lest the bloc feels forced to radicalize its stance.
            
Analysts suggest that China’s power will undermine the BRICs, and call for a Chinese-American alliance. Chinese disparage this possibility for they want to keep cooperating with developing countries, while avoiding competition with the US.

4 - COMPOSITION:
Taking due account of the text above and of China’s strategic objectives, comment on how its participation in the BRICS might fit into this framework.
[Length: 400-450 words]
[value: 50 marks]
            
In the joint declaration at the conclusion of the 4th BRICS Summit, the leaders of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa vowed to enhance mutual cooperation and contribute to world development and prosperity. The summit has come at a crucial moment, as the global economic recovery is still dragging its feet, entangled by fragile financial systems, high public and private debt, high unemployment and the rising price of oil. Pressing issues, such as climate change, food security and energy security also pose grave challenges. “BRICS cooperation now stands at a new starting point,” declared President Hu Jintao, adding that the five emerging economies need to build on current cooperation and blaze new trails so as to inject vitality into their mechanism and so usher in a more just, fair and reasonable international political and economic order.
China Daily, 30th March 2012. Internet: <www.chinadaily.com> (adapted)
➽ REDAÇÃO EM INGLÊS:            
While many Western countries still look hopeless trying to wade out of the economic morass into which they began to sink after the 2008 world crisis, the BRICS further their cooperation in order to address the most pressing issues today. Among them, China stands out as the most important emerging power of our times. Due to its singularity, it has three strategic objectives, which may benefit from BRICS cooperation: to achieve the appropriate level of development, necessary to grant its huge population a dignified life; to protect its territory against separatism; to make sure its ascend as a global superpower will be peaceful, i.e., that it will not entail confrontation with the US.
      
China is an ancient civilization, an Asian colossus, with a rich 5000-years history and a huge population. During most of its history, China has been an empire, but in the nineteenth century it fell prey to widespread corruption, internally, and was subjected to dreadful onslaughts by Western imperialism. As a result, its population has suffered severe hardship since then and only recently has China managed to begin its recovery. However, even today most part of the Chinese population still fights poverty and its under-development remains a cause for concern. Given that, China perceives the BRICS as a paramount forum, by means of which global economic governance may be reformed, so as to help, or at least not to hinder (as Araújo Castro would say) the development of the emerging powers and the rest of the Southern countries. 
      
Moreover, cooperation with the BRICS may also be of the utmost importance for China with respect to its territorial integrity. Throughout its history, and even today, Chinese leaders have always been cautious to prevent separatism from gaining momentum. Within the BRICS, China is able to establish closer links with two of its neighbors, India and Russia, thus neutralizing possible reasons for border issues, or being more capable of addressing them, were problems to emerge.
      
Furthermore, it can be said that Chinese culture is embedded in a notion of harmony. It does not want its inevitable rise as a superpower to be perceived as a threat by the “hypersensitive hegemon”, as Michael Glosny describes the US. China wants to emerge in a harmonious and peaceful way. Considering the jittery conditions of current international relations, the best way to avoid an aggressive North American reaction is to become closer to countries such as Brazil and India, which are commonly considered by the Western superpower as non-confrontational.
      
Given that there is no fundamental contradiction between China´s objectives and those of the other BRICS partners, it is reasonable to expect that China will continue to cooperate within the BRICS framework, in order to achieve its goals with respect to development, territorial integrity and peaceful coexistence with the US.